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INTRODUCTION
The practice of law by law students is a significant departure from the
general ethical prescription that only licensed members of a state bar are
entitled to represent clients. 1 Indeed, permitting students to practice law is
relatively unusual in the world. Clinic students in most other countries
usually perform only the tasks that law clerks and paralegals perform in
the United States.
Representation by supervised students has been deemed ethical and
appropriate, however, because its serves the needs of courts, clients, law
schools, the bar, and perhaps the country as well. Courts welcome student
practitioners because student representation of indigent litigants helps
courts fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide lawyers in criminal
cases, and because students bring some level of sophistication to practice
in civil cases where lawyers are not required by the Constitution. Clients
welcome student representation because students provide some guidance
and support where there otherwise would be none. Law schools, students,
and the bar welcome student practice because it bridges the gap between
theory and practice and increases students’ abilities to practice early in
their careers. In addition, it facilitates the formation of strong ethical and
professional foundations and protects the norms and values of the
profession by introducing them to new lawyers while they are still under
close supervision. Finally, student representation enhances the legal
system for everyone in the country by enabling more people to resolve
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(b) (2010) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
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their legal disputes in a fair manner in a court of law. 2 As long as the
students and their supervisors perform their duties adequately, no ethical
issues arise.
Experiential learning has become a prominent and sophisticated
aspect of modern legal education. Clinical faculties have grown and the
number and scope of clinical courses 3 have increased because the
pedagogy instills a deep appreciation of theory integrated with practice.
Growth has been encouraged by the organized bar which prefers its new
members to have clinical experience, and by students who crave the
practical, personal, and jurisprudential education that clinical studies
provide. As the demand for clinical education grew in the mid-to-late
20th-century, courts and state bars responded by promulgating student
practice rules that allowed students to represent people before local and
federal tribunals, prescribed the requirements for students’ eligibility, and
defined the roles and responsibilities of lawyers who would supervise
students’ work.
The District of Columbia was an early proponent of student practice,
enacting its first rules in 1968. Although those rules were modified
periodically during the two decades of their existence, they had remained
unchanged since the 1980s. Law schools and the practice of law, however,
have changed dramatically since 1980. As a result, the District of
Columbia rule, which was once a model for other states, became overly
restrictive and too narrow to address the new nature of practice and the
expansion of clinical courses in District of Columbia law schools. With
that in mind, a group of law professors from the six District of Columbia
law schools began studying student practice rules from around the country
in order to revise and modernize the District’s rules. They were later
joined by judges from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to further
refine the professors’ work and craft a set of amendments. The
amendments were implemented in the Fall of 2014.

2. Cf. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL? AN
EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW
INCOME COMMUNITY 42 (2009) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL].
3. The definition of clinical education varies depending upon who is using the term. The
American Bar Association defines a clinic as a course that provides substantial lawyering
experience that involves one or more actual clients and includes (i) advising or
representing a client; (ii) direct supervision of the student’s performance by a faculty
member; (iii) opportunities for performance, feedback from a faculty member, and selfevaluation; and (iv) a classroom instructional component. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL
EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 304(b) (2014). That definition, which describes what is
sometimes referred to as an “in-house clinic,” guides this article and guided the
conversations among the drafters of the amendments to the District of Columbia student
practice rule.
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This article traces the history of the amendment process. It provides a
short history of student practice rules and then, using the student practice
rule in effect in the District of Columbia prior to the 2014 amendments,
describes the various components of those rules that courts and bars across
the nation have implemented to assist courts, advance legal education, and
preserve advocates’ ethical obligations to clients. It then describes some of
the comments to the proposed amendments offered by the District of
Columbia Bar and other D.C. lawyers during the public comment period
and the modifications to the District of Columbia student practice rule that
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals accepted. Finally, it discusses
some areas of disagreement that arose during the process and a description
of the reasons for those disagreements.
I.

A SHORT HISTORY OF STUDENT PRACTICE RULES
A. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Long before the advent of formal student practice rules, several law
schools established legal aid dispensaries that allowed law students to
counsel or represent poor people in need of legal assistance. The legal
dispensaries arose during the late 1890s and early 1900s in reaction to
Christopher Columbus Langdell’s casebook method of instruction that
permeated legal education. 4 The movement also responded to a series of
articles written by Jerome Frank that advocated using legal dispensaries
and actual cases to train students, 5 and articles written by John Bradway
and William Rowe, that described the benefits law school clinical
education programs provided to students and clients. 6
Dispensaries were developed at the University of Cincinnati College
of Law, George Washington University Law School, Harvard Law School,
University of Minnesota Law School, Northwestern University School of
Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, University of Tennessee
College of Law, and Yale Law School throughout the 1890s and 1900s.7
4. Margaret Martin Barry, et al., Clinical Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave,
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 6 (2000).
5. See generally Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947);
Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical-Lawyer School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933).
6. See generally John S. Bradway, The Beginning of the Legal Clinic of the University of
Southern California, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 252 (1929); John S. Bradway, Legal Aid Clinic as
a Law School Course, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 320 (1930); John S. Bradway, The Legal Aid
Clinic as an Educational Device, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1153 (1934); John S. Bradway,
Legal Aid Clinics in Less Thickly Populated Communities, 30 MICH. L. REV. 905 (1932);
John S. Bradway, The Nature of a Legal Aid Clinic, 3 S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 174 (1930);
John S. Bradway, The Objectives of Legal Aid Clinic Work, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 173
(1939); William V. Rowe, Legal Clinics and Better Trained Lawyers—A Necessity, 11
ILL. L. REV. 591 (1917).
7. Barry et al., supra note 4, at 6 n.10.
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None of these schools’ states, however, had a student practice rule. The
first student practice rule was established in Colorado in 1909 8 to reflect
the work of the Denver University College of Law’s Legal Aid
Dispensary, 9 founded in 1904. The Colorado rule read,
Students of any law school which has been
continuously in existence for at least ten years
prior to the passage of this section and which
maintains a legal aid dispensary where poor
persons receive legal advice and services, shall
when representing said dispensary and its clients
and then only be authorized to appear in court as if
licensed to practice. 10
Notwithstanding this innovation, no other state court implemented a
student practice rule until 1957, when the courts of Wyoming 11 and
Massachusetts 12 promulgated such rules. Massachusetts, however, had
been allowing students to represent indigent clients in civil cases prior to
1957, based on a 1935 state supreme court statement that said “[t]he
gratuitous furnishing of legal aid to the poor . . . in the pursuit of any civil
remedy . . . do[es] not constitute the practice of law.” 13 Because their
representation was allowed based on a client’s status as indigent—not on
their own statuses as students—the Massachusetts students who
represented litigants before 1957 entered their appearances in court as
“citizens” rather than as “law students.” 14
The expansion of clinical education programs in American law
schools, which began in the late 1960s, accelerated a nation-wide
promulgation of state student practice rules. 15 This expansion was driven
by the social upheaval that accompanied the civil rights and anti-Vietnam
War movements, 16 a renewed dissatisfaction with the casebook method,
and the influx of money to law schools from the Ford Foundation and later
8. Student Practice as a Method of Legal Education and a Means of Providing Legal
Assistance to Indigents: An Empirical Study, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 370 (1973)
[hereafter Student Practice].
9. The Denver College of Law is now called University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
10. COL. STAT. ANN., ch. 9, § 254-A (1911).
11. WYO. BAR R. 18 (1957).
12. MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 3:11 (1957).
13. In re Opinion of the Justices, 194 N.E. 313, 317–18 (Mass. 1935), cited in Student
Practice, supra note 8, at 370 n. 40; see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Petition to Amend Local Rule 96, at 4 (D.C. 1968).
14. Student Practice, supra note 8, at 370 (citing Ridgberg, Student Practice Rules and
Statutes, in CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 223 (E. Kitch
ed. 1970)).
15. See Barry et al., supra note 4, at 16–19.
16. See id. at 12–17.
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the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR)
to establish clinical education programs. 17 The latter effort, led by CLEPR
director William Pincus, was met with some wariness on the part of both
courts and law schools. 18 Law schools, wedded to the Langdell method of
legal education for more than a half-century, 19 were reluctant to
reintroduce law practice into the university-based academic law
curriculum. Local courts, fearful that faculty members would turn the
simplest landlord-tenant case into a Supreme Court initiative, worried
about clogged court calendars and the intrusion of the social justice
movements of the 1960s and 1970s into every claim initiated by law
student counsel. Nonetheless, by 1968, at least fourteen states had
promulgated student practice rules. 20
Development of student practice rules accelerated again after 1969,
when the American Bar Association wrote a comprehensive model student
practice rule. 21 The ABA model rule acknowledged the court’s and the
bar’s duties to provide legal representation to the poor and encouraged law
schools to join that effort by creating clinical instruction in trial work. 22
The rule set forth the kinds of cases and the tribunals wherein
representation by law students should be permitted, 23 the eligibility
requirements for student certification, 24 and the eligibility requirements
for supervising faculty and other lawyers who would guide students’
work. 25 The validity of these rules gained further credence after Supreme
Court Justice William Brennan noted in his concurrence in Argersinger v.
17. See id. at 18–20; J. P. “Sandy” Ogilvy, Celebrating CLEPR's 40th Anniversary: The
Early Development of Clinical Legal Education and Legal Ethics Instruction in U.S. Law
Schools, 16 CLINICAL. L. REV. 1, 9–15 (2009); Elliot Milstein, Professor of Law,
American University Washington College of Law, Why the Clinical Section Award is
Called the “William Pincus Award,” delivered January 2009 (on file with author).
18. See Wallace Mlyniec, The Intersection of Three Visions—Ken Pye, Bill Pincus, and
William Greenhalgh—and the Development of Clinical Teaching Fellowships, 64 TENN.
L. REV. 963, 965 (1997).
19. The case method of legal education, first implemented (and likely developed) by
Christopher Columbus Langdell during his tenure as Dean of Harvard Law School during
the late Nineteenth Century, employs Socratic questioning to narrow students’
interpretations of appellate cases to develop legal analysis skills and doctrinal mastery.
See Russell L. Weaver, Langdell’s Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L.
REV. 517, 520–27 (1991).
20. Colorado (1909), Massachusetts and Wyoming (1957), Connecticut and Michigan
(1963), Florida and New Jersey (1964), New York (1965), Georgia, Iowa, Oklahoma,
Minnesota, and Tennessee (1967), and District of Columbia (1968). Frank G. Avellone,
The State of State Student Practice: Proposals for Reforming Ohio’s Legal Internship
Rule, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 13, 13 n.1 (1990).
21. See generally ABA, Model Student Practice Rule, 94 REP. OF THE ABA 290 (1969).
22. Id. at Section I.
23. Id. at Section II.
24. Id. at Section III.
25. Id. at Section IV.
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Hamlin that “law students can be expected to make a significant
contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the representation of the
poor in many areas.” 26 Today, every state has a student practice rule and
every law school has a clinical education program. 27
B. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EXPERIENCE

The District of Columbia was among the earliest adopters of a student
practice rule. An April 1968 proposal by the deans of the five District of
Columbia law schools 28 sought to amend what was then Local Rule 9629
to allow third-year law students to represent indigent litigants. The Board
of Judges for the Court of General Sessions passed a June 20, 1968
resolution, by a vote of 12-2, stating that the Board supported “the
principle of third year law student participation with members of the Bar
present as counsel of record in the representation of indigents.” 30 The
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, acting in its
supervisory capacity, voted down the proposed amendment, apparently
emphasizing the Board’s ambiguous conclusion rather than its stated
philosophical support for student practice. 31
26. 407 U.S. 25 at 44 (1972).
27. See Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, GEORGETOWN LAW LIBRARY,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/StudentPractice.cfm (last visited
Nov. 11, 2014).
28. In re Application of the District of Columbia Law Schools, and Certain Other
Interested Parties, For an Addition to Local Rule 96 of the United States District of
Columbia to Allow for Special Appearances Without Compensation by Third Year Law
Students on Behalf of Indigents in the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions,
Local Rule 96, 1–2 (1968) (on file with author). B.J Tennery, American University
Washington College of Law; Vernon X. Miller, Catholic University of America
Columbus School of Law; C. Clyde Ferguson, Howard University Law School; Paul R.
Dean, Georgetown University Law Center; and Robert Kramer, George Washington
University National Law Center signed the petition. Also signing the petition were John
E. Powell, President, Bar Association of the District of Columbia, and Peter H. Wolf, a
principal drafter of the student practice rule. Id. At the time, there were only five law
schools. Cf. id. The University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of
Law, founded as Antioch Law School, opened in 1972. School of Law History, UNIV. OF
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=History (last visited Jan. 8,
2015).
29. D.C. App. R. 96 (1967) then permitted only Bar-admitted lawyers to appear before
the Court.
30. Peter Wolf, D.C. Law School Students in the Courtroom, 36 D.C. B. J. 11, 42 (1969).
31. Id. Apparently in response to the initial assertion by Board of Judges that no
amendment was necessary to allow students to represent indigent clients in the Court of
General Sessions, proponents of the amendment pointed out that the proposed change
would be permissive, not mandatory: the updated rule would make it clear that the Court
of General Sessions could permit students to represent indigents but that they would not
be required to give such permission. The deans also described the immense and growing
need for adequate legal representation of indigent litigants and cited examples of
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During the summer of 1968, the Rules Committee for the Court of General
Sessions proposed the following amendment, which the Board of Judges
adopted on September 25, 1968 by a 12-2 vote:
No person other than a member in good standing of the Bar of this
Court shall be permitted to appear in this branch in a representative
capacity except (1) for the purpose of securing a continuance, and
except further (2) a third-year law student may participate fully in
the representation of an indigent defendant, and in doing so may
address the Court and interrogate witnesses, provided that a
member of the Bar of this Court is present as counsel of record for
the indigent defendant and is supervising the student’s
participation. 32
On October 14, 1968, at the urging of Supreme Court Justice Tom Clark,
United States Senator from Maryland Joseph Tydings, United States
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold, other legal dignitaries, and numerous
academics and legal nonprofits, 33 the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia finally approved the change to the General Sessions
rule in the form the Rules Committee recommended.
The original rule reflected a time when law school clinical courses
were still experimental and when clinical field work took place only in the
District of Columbia courts. This did not change when the student practice
rule was rewritten and implemented after Court Reorganization in 1971 34
to permit law students to practice in the new District of Columbia Superior
Court and the new Court of Appeals. 35 Nor did it change when minor
revisions were made throughout the 1970s 36 or when the larger revisions

jurisdictions where student representation of such clients had been found adequate if not
superior to other options.
32. Wallace Mlyniec, Unlabeled in Law Students in Court Papers (unpublished
manuscripts) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Law Students in Court Paper]
(describing Law Students in the Court Clinic when Mlyniec worked as the Clinical
Coordinator at Georgetown University Law Center).
33. Peter Wolf, D.C. Law School Students in the Courtroom, 36 D.C. B. J. 11, 42–43
(1969).
34. Prior to Court Reorganization, District of Columbia courts were administered by the
federal courts for the District of Columbia. After reorganization, the D.C. courts became
independent and were treated similarly to state courts, although they remained courts of
the United States pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution. Palmore v.
United States, 411 U.S. 389, 398–99 (1973).
35. See, e.g., Superior Court of the District of Columbia Order, 99 DAILY WASH. L.
REPORTER 1980 (Nov. 9, 1971); United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Order, 99 DAILY WASH. L. REPORTER 1980 (Nov. 9, 1971).
36. See, e.g., Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 100 DAILY. WASH. L.
REPORTER 2219 (Nov. 9, 1972.
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occurred in 1982. 37 Thus, the rules existing in the Superior Court and
Court of Appeals rules that were subject to the 2014 amendments did not
address the vast array of legal practice that exists today.
Law Students in Court (LSIC), the original law school clinical
program in the District of Columbia, was founded in 1968 as a consortium
program comprised of all of the D.C. law schools, 38 in close connection
with Rule 96s amendment the same year. Though the rule permitted
student practice in any civil or criminal case, in the clinic’s early years
LSIC staff supervised students from participating District of Columbia law
schools only in Landlord and Tenant and Small Claims Court
proceedings. 39 After 1971, additional law school clinical courses focusing
on many other subject matters were created at the law schools. 40 The
District of Columbia law schools became pioneers in providing students
with opportunities to engage in supervised law practice through a wide
array of clinical legal education courses. Today, the schools’ clinical
offerings are far broader than what was contemplated at the time the
student practice rule took its pre-amendment form in 1982. 41
II. CHALLENGES TO STUDENT PRACTICE
37. These revisions were proposed by the then-clinical deans and directors of the District
of Columbia law schools. See Appendix A for the text of the 1982 version of D.C. App.
R. 48.
38. In the beginning, the Judges preferred that the schools pool their resources so that the
court would have one point of contact.
39. 3rd Yr. Students to Civil Courts? GEORGETOWN LAW WEEKLY, Feb. 15, 1968. In
1972, LSIC launched a criminal justice division, which enabled students to represent
individuals charged with misdemeanors punishable by no more than one year in prison.
Law Students in Court Papers, supra note 32, at 2.
40. See, for example, the Jacob Burns Community Clinics that were formed in 1971 on a
wide range of other issues, including domestic violence and immigration. The Jacob
Burns
Community
Legal Clinics,
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV.,
http://www.law.gwu.edu/academics/el/clinics/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited Jan. 8,
2015). Antioch Law School, the District’s sixth law school, which was founded in 1972,
created legal clinics pursuant to Rule 96. School of Law History, UNIV. OF THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA, http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=History (last visited Jan. 8, 2015). It later
became the University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law. Id.
41. See infra “Modernizing the District of Columbia Rule;” see also, e.g., Clinical
Program, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON COLL. OF LAW, http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical
(last visited Nov. 26, 2014); Law Clinics, THE CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM.,
http://clinics.law.edu/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014); Our Clinics, GEORGETOWN LAW,
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-programs/clinical-programs/ourclinics/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2014); The Jacob Burns Community Legal Clinics, THE
GEORGE
WASHINGTON
UNIV.,
http://www.law.gwu.edu/academics/el/clinics/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 5,
UNIV.
SCH.
OF
LAW,
2014);
Clinical
Law
Center,
HOWARD
http://www.law.howard.edu/10 (last visited Jan. 8, 2015); Introduction to the Clinical
Program, UNIV. OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DAVID A. CLARKE SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=ClinicIntro (last visited Jan. 8, 2015).
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Challenges to student practice have arisen periodically since the
inception of student practice rules, but courts have uniformly upheld the
validity of the rules. Few challenges have arisen in civil cases; 42 most
have come in criminal and juvenile defendants’ motions for postconviction relief and in criminal and juvenile appeals. Appellants have
alleged either (1) constitutional violations of either the absolute right to
counsel 43 or the right to effective assistance of counsel 44 or (2) procedural
or substantive breaches of the jurisdiction’s student practice rules. 45
A. CLAIMS BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES

Constitutional challenges to student practice have rested on either of
two claims: (1) that representation by a student lawyer absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel constitutes a violation of the
Sixth Amendment’s absolute guarantee; 46 or (2) that a student’s
participation made counsel unconstitutionally ineffective. 47 Courts have
sometimes responded to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims by
assessing the supervising attorney’s effectiveness and by considering the
student’s practice errors (procedural 48 or substantive 49) as one element in
the Strickland analysis. 50 Appellants have lost in those cases. 51

42. Student practice challenges in civil cases are rare. In Hayden v. Elam, 739 So.2d
1088, 1093–94 (Ala. 1999), an unsuccessful civil defendant moved for a new trial,
alleging that he was denied a fair trial due to a statement the plaintiff’s student-attorney
made during her closing argument. The student had argued that a claim the defendant
corporation made on a tax return was made “under penalty of perjury.” The court noted
that the student and supervising attorney had not complied with the letter of the law when
the student entered her appearance for the plaintiff-appellee. Nonetheless, the court found
that the student had not accused the defendant-appellant of perjury and that her argument
had not created sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial. Id. at 1093. In Haro-Ramos v.
INS, 44 F. App’x 168, 170 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit upheld a deportation order
where the record provided no evidence concerning the student’s compliance with the
state student practice rule.
43. E.g., People v. Nelson, 156 Cal. Rptr. 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
44. E.g., United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 286 (8th Cir. 1994).
45. E.g., People v. Flemming, No. A130683, 2013 WL 940361, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App.
March 12, 2013).
46. E.g., id.
47. E.g., Rimell, 21 F.3d at 284.
48. In re Denzel W., 930 N.E.2d 974, 983 (Ill. 2010).
49. Matter of Moore, 380 N.E.2d 917, 921 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); Hudson v. State, 375 So.
2d 355, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
50. Strickland v. Washington established that a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel is violated where counsel is objectively deficient and there is a
reasonable probability that the attorney’s errors prejudiced the outcome of the case. 466
U.S. 668, 693–96 (1984).
51. Moore, 380 N.E.2d at 921; Hudson, 375 So. 2d at 355.
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Claims that student representation amounts to a constitutional
violation unless the defendant has waived his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel have failed because courts have recognized that the supervising
attorney’s presence and participation fulfills the constitutional mandate.52
Courts have therefore been unwilling to require a showing that an
appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel when he
consented to a student’s participation in his defense. 53
Appellants claiming ineffective assistance of counsel have argued that
courts should deem counsel ineffective per se where attorneys fail to
strictly comply with a student practice rule’s procedural requirements. 54
No court has accepted that argument, 55 and the Denzel W. court specified
that the Strickland 56 test—not a per se rule—should determine the issue. 57
B. CLAIMS BASED ON VIOLATIONS OF STUDENT PRACTICE RULES

Challenges based on violations of state student practice rules have
usually relied on claims that failure to comport with rule-mandated
procedure—most commonly, failure to obtain or file the defendant’s
written consent—should invalidate a verdict against the party represented
52. See, e.g., People v. Flemming, No. A130683, 2013 WL 940361, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App.
March 12, 2013); Gartman v. Pierce, No. 05-CV-3123, 2012 WL 1932118, at *23 (N.D.
Ill. May 29, 2012); People v. Nelson, 156 Cal. Rptr. 244, 250 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979);
People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 138 (1979).
53. See Flemming, 2013 WL 940361 at *9; Gartman, 2012 WL 1932118 at *23; Perez,
24 Cal. 3d at 144. See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (establishing that
a valid waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel must be knowing and intelligent).
In State v. Edwards, 351 So. 2d 500 (La. 1977), the Supreme Court of Louisiana rejected
an appellant’s claim that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel when a studentattorney represented him at a pretrial suppression hearing without a supervising attorney
present. Although the court found that the defendant had not consented in writing to the
student’s participation, it upheld the conviction because it concluded the violation of the
court rule did not constitute a constitutional violation.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1994); In re Denzel W.,
930 N.E.2d 974, 984 (Ill. 2010).
55. See, e.g., Rimell, 21 F.3d at 286; Denzel W., 930 N.E.2d at 984.
56. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693–96 (1984).
57. Denzel W., 930 N.E.2d at 984; see also Duval v. State, 744 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (applying Strickland to conclude that a failure to file defendant’s written
consent to student’s participation did not make counsel ineffective, where appellant did
not allege actual ineffectiveness). At least once, an appellate court has reversed a
conviction obtained while the defendant was represented by a student because the trial
court had prevented the defendant from obtaining constitutionally adequate counsel. In
City of Seattle v. Ratliff, 100 Wash. 2d 212 (1983), the trial court required a student to
represent a defendant unsupervised despite the student’s claim that he would not be able
to supply effective counsel. However, the counsel provided was substantively ineffective
because the student, who was representing the defendant in a different action and was
summoned to court when the defendant appeared alone, was unfamiliar with the case—
not because of the student’s status. Id. at 221.
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by a student. 58 Appellants who have brought such claims have lost either
because the court has found sufficient compliance with the rule or because
noncompliance did not prejudice the defendant. 59
Appellants have succeeded where they have shown they were unaware
that they were being represented by students 60 and where courts have
placed the burden of persuasion on appellees to refute allegations that
appellants had not actually consented to student participation. 61 In one
such case, the student was unsupervised. 62 In others, students
misrepresented their statuses to the defendant and/or the court. 63 Florida’s
58. See In re Joseph Children, 470 S.E.2d 539, 542 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); State v. Dwyer,
512 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); cf. Hayden v. Elam, 739 So. 2d 1088, 1093
(Ala. 1999) (finding that by failing to file a revised updated consent form after the
supervising attorney was replaced, counsel for a civil plaintiff denied the trial court the
chance to determine whether it was appropriate to allow a student to participate in the
proceedings (one of the purposes stated in the student practice rule), but that the error did
not warrant a new trial for the defendant-appellant).
59. People v. Flemming, No. A130683, 2013 WL 940361, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. March
12, 2013); Joseph Children, 470 S.E.2d at 542; Dwyer, 512 N.W.2d at 824 (invoking “no
harm, no foul” reasoning); State v. Daniels, 346 So. 2d 672, 674 (La. 1977); see also
Gartman v. Pierce, No. 05-CV-3123, 2012 WL 1932118, at *23 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2012)
(ruling against a habeas petitioner who at first claimed no actual consent but then
changed his argument to allege failure of procedural consent to his student lawyer’s
participation at trial).
60. In Matter of Moore, the Illinois court of appeals vacated a decision ordering an
individual committed for mental treatment, on the grounds that neither the defendant nor
the lower court judge actually knew the defendant’s appointed counsel was a student. 380
N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978). The student was identified as such at the first
hearing but thereafter, before a different judge who presided over the jury trial, he was
identified as an “assistant public defender.” Id. at 900. The student was appointed to
second-chair at the trial over the defendant’s request to represent himself. Id. See also
Hudson v. State, 375 So. 2d 355, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (remanding for an
evidentiary hearing where the appellant claimed students represented him at trial
“without his knowledge or consent”). The Hudson court relied on Cheatham v. State, 364
So. 2d 83, 83–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), and Huckleberry v. State, 337 So. 2d 400,
401 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). In Cheatham, a Florida appeals court overturned denial of
an aggravated assault defendant’s motion for post-conviction relief because the state
failed to refute the appellant’s claim that he had not been informed of or consented to
representation by a legal intern. 364 So. 2d at 84. The student had not been supervised by
a licensed attorney. Id. at 83. In Huckleberry, a Florida District Court of Appeals vacated
judgment against a defendant who had pled guilty to first-degree murder under the advice
of court-appointed counsel. The public defender whom the court initially appointed
delegated the duty to a recent law school graduate who had passed the bar exam but
failed to meet the state bar’s character requirements. Huckleberry, 337 So. 2d at 402.
Neither the court nor the defendant was aware at the time the defendant entered his plea
that the defendant’s counsel was not a member of the bar. Id. at 401.
61. In Interest of C.B., 546 So. 2d 447, 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); People v. Schlaiss,
528 N.E.2d 334, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Cheatham, 364 So. 2d at 83–84.
62. Cheatham, 364 So. 2d at 83.
63. Schlaiss, 528 N.E.2d at 336 (student was accompanied by a licensed attorney but
introduced himself to the court as an “assistant public defender”).
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Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed a conviction, finding
insufficient evidence to refute an appellant’s claim of no consent, despite
the student attorney’s testimony that the defendant had had actual notice
of the student’s status. 64
Less common among challenges under state student practice rules are
claims alleging that a student’s participation in legal proceedings at all
constitutes unauthorized practice of law. 65 In People v. Perez, the
California Supreme Court rejected a claim that a student’s participation in
the appellant’s trial abrogated the appellant’s constitutional right to
counsel. 66 The court highlighted the rule’s drafters’ care in protecting the
right to counsel and asserted in dicta that a student’s participation in court
proceedings was not necessarily unauthorized practice of law merely
because the court had not yet formally accepted the student practice rule
promulgated by the state bar. 67 The Perez court elected not to resolve the
unauthorized practice issue because the law student had appeared in good
faith pursuant to the Bar rule. 68 Perez upheld the defendant’s conviction
because the defendant had consented to the student’s appearance and
received competent representation. 69
Other challenges have arisen in the course of students’ representation
of clients that have not been recorded in decisional law. Such challenges
include complaints that have struck at the scope of student practice rules. 70
Opponents of student-represented litigants have attempted to claim that
students may not represent certain classes of clients, such as nonprofit
corporations; others have taken issue with definitions of indigence,
alleging that an opposing party does not clear the common threshold of
eligibility for student representation. We know of no appellate case that
has addressed such complaints.
III.

MODERNIZING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RULE
A. THE PROCESS

With the history of the District of Columbia rule and challenges to
student practice rules in mind, a group of professors and clinical deans and
directors from the District of Columbia law schools formed an ad-hoc
committee in 2008 to re-examine the District of Columbia student practice

64. In Interest of C.B., 546 So. 2d at 447.
65. See, e.g., People v. Perez, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 143 (1979).
66. See generally Perez, 24 Cal. 3d at 133.
67. Id. at 136.
68. Id. at 143.
69. Id.
70. These examples have been obtained by the author though conversations with clinical
teachers and statements made at various clinical conferences.
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rules. 71 The original rules and later revisions reflected times in which law
school clinical courses were still experimental and when clinical students
practiced in only the District of Columbia courts. The District of Columbia
Access to Justice Commission had noted that law school clinical programs
were important service providers in a city where the legal needs of the
poor and middle class were seldom met; however, the existing student
practice rules did not appear to reflect the important and expanding role
clinical programs play in providing representation to under-served
populations. 72 Recent changes in the District of Columbia Unauthorized
Practice Rules 73 and the maturation of clinical education nationwide and
in the District of Columbia suggested that the District of Columbia student
practice rules 74 had not kept pace with pedagogical innovations or the
evolution of legal practice.
The ad-hoc committee’s goals were to review the District of Columbia
Courts’ student practice rules to determine which parts no longer reflected
nationwide trends in legal education and student practice and which were
no longer consistent with other D.C. Bar rules implemented after the
District of Columbia student rules were last amended. The ad-hoc
committee agreed that if it found the rules were in need of revision, it
would draft proposed amendments. Those amendments, if required, would
reflect the prevailing models of state student practice rules and best

71. Faculty members who worked on the project were Robert Dinerstein from American
University Washington College of Law; Catherine Klein from Catholic University
Columbus School of Law; Karen Foreman and Joseph Tulman from the University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law; Jane Aiken, Deborah Epstein, and
Wallace Mlyniec from Georgetown University Law Center; Phyllis Goldfarb from
George Washington Law School; and Tamar Meekins from Howard University Law
School. Mark Carlin, former Chair of the Committee on Admissions, also assisted with
the project.
72. The services clinical programs provide to the court and to citizens of the District of
Columbia should not be underestimated. Clinical education programs save the courts and
the city hundreds of thousands of dollars yearly. Moreover, the activities of the clinical
education programs have strengthened the cause of justice, improved the lives of
countless citizens, and better prepared students for the practice of law. Students are
important legal service providers in the initiatives of the District of Columbia Access to
Justice Commission. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 42; see also id. at 43–82. The
clinics also inculcate in students the best traditions of the legal profession and create the
foundation for a lifetime of pro bono service. In short, clinical education programs are
significant participants in the legal culture of the region and in the administration of
justice.
73. See D.C. App. R. 49. Some members of the ad-hoc committee also believed that a
comparison of the student practice rules and the unauthorized practice rules indicated
gaps between the two sets of rules that suggested that some clinical students might be
practicing without lawful authority.
74. See D.C. App. R. 48.
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practices in clinical education. 75 The new rules would also continue to
guarantee the exemplary practice that for years students had rendered to
courts, agencies, and clients, and would comport with the definition of
“the practice of law” set forth in the District of Columbia Unauthorized
Practice of Law Rules. 76 Finally, the amendments would recognize the
evolution and success of area law schools’ programs, modernize the rule
and make it consistent with best practices, and recognize the growing need
for additional legal services for people with low incomes.
The ad-hoc committee met from time to time to consider the rules. It
quickly determined that the District of Columbia student practice rules,
once a progressive and innovative model for other states to emulate, had
lagged behind other rules’ developments, leaving it one of the most
restrictive student practice rules in the country. The District of Columbia
rules, unlike the rules in other states, unnecessarily limited student and
client eligibility and were vague concerning transactional practice and a
student’s ability to give legal advice in matters not destined to become
legal conflicts. The rules did not clearly authorize practice in non-District
of Columbia fora, and they required students to be screened for character
in a manner that was costly, cumbersome, and inconsistent with practices
in other states. Though the programs and practices of clinical faculty in the
District of Columbia had become models for clinical program design and
75. See generally ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, A
VISION
AND
A
ROAD
MAP
(2007)
available
at
http://www.cleaweb.org/Resources/Documents/best_practices-full.pdf. A second edition
of Best Practices will appear in late 2014.
76. The Unauthorized Practice Rule defines the “practice of law” as “the provision of
professional legal advice or services where there is a client relationship of trust or
reliance” and provides that “[o]ne is presumed to be practicing law when engaging in any
of the following conduct on behalf of another:
(A) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages,
assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other instruments
intended to affect interests in real or personal property, wills, codicils,
instruments intended to affect the disposition of property of decedents’
estates, other instruments intended to affect or secure legal rights, and
contracts except routine agreements incidental to a regular course of
business;
(B)
Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
(C)
Appearing or acting as an attorney in any tribunal;
(D)
Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or
any written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of law,
for filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal;
(E)
Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities
described in sub-paragraph (A) through (D) might be done, or whether
they were done, in accordance with applicable law;
(F)
Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to
render the services described in subparagraphs (a) through (e) above.”
D.C. App. R. 49(b).
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pedagogy throughout the country, the rules did not recognize how
sophisticated clinical pedagogy had become. This shortcoming was not the
result of anyone’s negligence. The clinical programs and the courts
worked splendidly together throughout the early existence of the rules.
Because of the absence of any conflict, no one had bothered to take a hard
look at the rules for a very long time.
It took several years for the ad-hoc committee to draft a set of
amendments that were generally acceptable to the clinical faculties of each
school. With the proposed amendments in hand, I, representing the ad-hoc
committee, began meeting in April 2011 with the Honorable John R.
Fisher, Associate Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and
Chair of its Rules Committee, to further refine the ad-hoc committee’s
work. Discussion between the Court and the ad-hoc committee occurred in
three phases: The first phase consisted of a several-year conversation
between Judge Fisher and me. The second involved similar conversations
between the Court’s Rules Committee 77 and me, followed by a
presentation before the Board of Judges. During and after each stage, I
reported back to the committee for additional guidance and continued the
discussions with the judges. Once the ad-hoc committee and the judges
reached agreement, the Board issued an Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to invite public comment. 78 The final phase of the ad-hoc
committee’s work involved discussions among Judge Fisher, Judge
McLeese, and me, with guidance from the ad-hoc committee, regarding
the comments the Court received from the public. Most of the public
comments received by the Court were supportive of student practice and
of the amendments, and thus, they merely supported the conclusions of the
Court and the ad-hoc committee. The District of Columbia Bar and the pro
bono community made more significant comments, with the former
requesting tighter restrictions on supervisors than the amendments
proposed, and the latter requesting that the Court expand the proposed rule
to provide clients greater access to students.
The original amendments to the rules the ad-hoc committee proposed
were not immediately accepted by the judges, and the proposal changed
over time. Each iteration of the proposed amendments underwent new
debate and consideration by the ad-hoc committee, guided by the goal of
devising a set of amendments that would regulate student practice in the
areas of law in which the clinical programs were currently providing

77. The Court’s committee was composed of Judge Fisher and Associate Judges
Catharine F. Easterly, Roy W. McLeese III, and Kathryn A. Oberly. When the ad-hoc
committee’s discussions with the Board of Judges began, Judge Fisher was the chair. By
the time the amendments were finalized, Judge McLeese had become the chair.
78. Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Student Practice), No. M-237-10 (D.C.
Oct. 31, 2013).
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representation 79 and expand the number of low-income clients clinics and
their students could represent. Differences between the judges and the adhoc committee were resolved when proponents of one or another view
were more persuasive, when the ad-hoc committee and the judges reached
a compromise position that satisfied the schools and the Court, or when
the judges determined to follow their own approach despite disagreement
with members of the ad-hoc committee. Throughout the process,
Associate Judge John Fisher and I remained the principal revisers of the
amendments. The conversations were never acrimonious. Rather, our
conversations were intellectual and philosophical discussions about the
nature of the bar, the limits and responsibilities of law schools, and the
intersection between the two when it came to student practice. In the end,
our disagreements were small and we arrived at consensus about most
issues with little discussion.
B. THE AMENDMENTS

The proposed amendments considered (1) case, client, and student
eligibility; (2) the admission and certification process; (3) fees and
payments for services; and (4) supervisor qualifications. The ad-hoc
committee believed the proposed amendments should provide consistency
between the student practice rules and current law school practices and
should make the rules consistent with best practices and student practice
rules currently in force throughout the country. The remainder of this
article provides an analysis of each proposed amendment, a description of
the final product, and analyses of the two issues that proved most difficult
to resolve.
1.

ELIGIBILITY FOR REPRESENTATION

The practice of law and the nature of clinical education had changed
dramatically between 1982, when the District of Columbia student
practice rules were last updated, and 2008, when the ad-hoc committee
began considering new amendments. The number of clinical courses had
grown, and the nature of their work was no longer confined to the practice
of criminal law and representation in small claims and landlord-tenant
matters in local courts. Pursuant to special student practice rules, clinical
programs had expanded their work into federal, international, and nonDistrict of Columbia state courts, into state and federal legislative bodies,
and into federal and state agencies. For example, students were litigating

79. As noted infra notes 87–89, the rules as originally written and existing in 2014 were
directed primarily at cases involving litigation in the courts. The requirements regarding
representation in non-litigation matters were vague.
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in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 80 the United States
Immigration Court, 81 Maryland state courts, 82 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, 83 and the United States Appellate
Courts in the District of Columbia and Fourth Circuits. 84 In addition to
traditional court and agency matters, law students were working on
community development projects, tenant conversions of property, small
business development, tax preparation, and many other forms of legal
work that required client counseling, drafting, and advocacy under the
supervision of clinical faculty. In some clinics, students took primary
responsibility for their cases in other tribunals just as they did for their
cases in the District of Columbia Superior Court. In a few, they acted as
law clerks in much the same way law students function in law firms. 85
These changes in the academy mirrored the changes in modern law
practice. In the early years of clinical education, law practice was directed
toward litigation and based primarily on common-law concepts. Today,
modern law practice is transnational, multi-jurisdictional, regulatory,
transactional, and dominated by settlement-oriented resolutions.86
Moreover, much legal work today is engendered by mutual advantage, not
by dispute. Such practice is based less on common-law principles than on
regulatory and legislative enactments and principles of cooperation and
contract. Although the 1982 student practice rules were read to cover such
diverse practices, they were vague and open to contradictory
80. See International Human Rights Law Clinic, AM. UNIV. WASHINGTON SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.wcl.american.edu/clinical/inter.cfm (last visited Nov. 11, 2014); see also
Charlotte Cassel, Human Rights Clinic Participates in Hearing on Stand Your Ground
Laws Before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, MIAMI LAW NEWS (Apr,
15, 2014), http://www.law.miami.edu/news/2014/april/2764.php.
81. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 1292.1, 292.1 (governing practice before the United States
Immigration Court).
82. Cf. MD. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR R. 16.
83. See, e.g., Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116 (D.D.C. 2006).
84. Students practicing in federal courts do so pursuant to the student rules of the various
federal circuits relating to “non-lawyers.” See, e.g., D.C. Cir. R. 46 (2013); cf. Sperry v.
Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Bridges, 759 A.2d
233 (Md. 2000); Kennedy v. Bar Ass’n of Montgomery Cnty., 561 A.2d 200 (Md. 1989).
85. Students acting merely as law clerks need not be certified pursuant to the D.C. student
practice rules since they are not practicing law as defined by the Unauthorized Practice
Rule. See Commentary to D.C. App. R. § 49(b)(2). They give no advice to clients, do not
appear in court, and do not sign legal documents.
86. See generally CONSTANCE BAGLEY, WINNING LEGALLY: HOW TO USE THE LAW TO
CREATE VALUE, MARSHAL RESOURCES, AND MANAGE RISK (2013); CARRIE MENKELMEADOW, Foundations of Dispute Resolution, 1 COMPLEX DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2141965 (tracing the theory that dispute resolution
need not be zero-sum to Western cultural revolution in the 1980s); Lon Fuller, The Form
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARVARD L. REV. 2, 394–404 (1978) (describing
“polycentric” legal problems and positing that some are too complex to be resolved
through litigation).
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interpretations. For example, the 1982 rules permitted students to practice
in any civil case but seemed to qualify that by referring to cases “which
may be pending in any court or administrative tribunal.” 87 The rules also
permitted students to prepare pleadings and other documents, but again
seemed to refer only to documents that would be filed in pending cases. 88
Some read the rule broadly by asserting that any legal matters could end
up in a court case; others advanced a stricter interpretation, saying that
student practice was limited to cases actually in or pending litigation. The
ad-hoc committee sought greater specificity regarding the authority for
students to practice in non-litigation matters so that the lower courts,
administrative tribunals, opposing lawyers, and the Bar would understand
the scope of student practice. Clarification would also give law schools
clear guidance as they developed and expanded their clinical programs to
meet the needs of underserved individuals and non-profit organizations. 89
Recent changes in the Court’s Unauthorized Practice Rule90
established that the practice of law in the District of Columbia was not
confined to appearances before District of Columbia courts. Rule 49 states
that giving legal advice while occupying a law office in the District of
Columbia is the “practice of law,” whether or not litigation is
contemplated and irrespective of the fora in which litigation may occur. 91
If the 1982 student practice rules were narrowly interpreted, once could
argue that students were violating the unauthorized practice rules by
providing representation in areas not specially touching on cases in or
pending litigation. Given the wide-ranging practices of contemporary
clinical education programs, the ad-hoc committee believed it would be
prudent for the student practice rules to reflect the general propositions of
the unauthorized practice rules.
When drafting the 2014 amendments, the ad-hoc committee wanted to
ensure that the new rules anticipated the expansion of clinical programs to
meet the unmet legal needs of District of Columbia citizens and the
evolving educational needs of students. 92 The ad-hoc committee believed
students were capable of providing quality representation in expanded
areas of practice. During the 45 years of the rule’s existence, the quality of
87. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1) (1982).
88. Id.
89. Knowing, understanding, and complying with the Court’s Rules of Professional
Conduct and Unauthorized Practice play a significant role in clinical legal education.
Clarity in the rules assists in that training.
90. D.C. App. R. 49.
91. See D.C. App. R. 49(b)(3). The Unauthorized Practice Rule recognize some
exceptions to this general rule. See D.C. App. R. 49(c). Most pertinent are those rules
regarding federal practice.
92. The value of clinical education was first noted by the U. S. Supreme Court in
Argersinger v. Hamlin. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra n.2, passim.
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the students’ representation of and dedication to their clients had seldom,
if ever, been seriously questioned. To the best of the ad-hoc committee’s
knowledge, no student had ever been sanctioned by either the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals or the District of Columbia Superior Court, or
had his or her license revoked pursuant to the student practice rules. The
ad-hoc committee also knew that students had performed admirably
throughout the country in all areas of practice 93 and that the case law
surrounding student practice rules recognized that students provided
exemplary services. 94 The directors of the law school clinics knew of no
students in the District of Columbia who had ever being denied a student
license. 95 Faculty clinical supervisors were experienced practitioners in
their fields, and the quality of faculty supervision at District of Columbia
law schools had always been considered exemplary. Indeed, judges of the
District of Columbia and federal courts praised students and faculty for
their work and often requested that students take on additional clients.
There was never any doubt that the partnership between the courts and
the law schools, which began as an experiment in the 1960s, had
succeeded beyond all measure. Today almost every law school in the
United States has some form of clinical program and every state has a
student practice rule. 96 The American Bar Association Accreditation
Standards 97 require that law schools provide skills training, 98 and
recognize the educational value of live-client clinical opportunities, 99
simulation courses, 100 and field placement programs. 101 The ABA’s
MacCrate Report has called on law schools to pay more attention to
teaching legal skills and values in law school, 102 and a recent Carnegie
93. Indeed, nationwide, we know of no student who has ever had his or her license
revoked for misfeasance or poor performance. Instances of poor performance have
occasionally been handled inside the law school. Clinical Education Listserv, lawclinicbounces@lists.washlaw.edu (Jan. 24 – Jan. 31, 2009) (on file with the author) (providing
results from the discussion of the clinical teachers).
94. See, e.g., Santiago v. Pinello, 647 F. Supp. 2d 239, 245 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[S]tudents
have provided exemplary representation of the plaintiff.”).
95. Mark Carlin does not recall any student being denied admission during his tenure as
chair. Interview with Mark Carlin, Chair, District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Committee on Admission, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 23, 2009). One student with
multiple criminal convictions did apply but chose not to submit clarifying information to
the Committee on Admissions. Interview with Tamar Meekins, Professor, Howard Law
School, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 10, 2009).
96. See, e.g., Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27.
97. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS
AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 15–25.
98. Id. at 15 (Standard 302(d)).
99. Id. at 17 (Standard 304).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 18 (Standard 305).
102. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, LEGAL
EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM
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Foundation Report, Educating Lawyers, Preparation for the Profession of
Law, calls for an expansion of clinical courses throughout American law
schools’ curricula. 103 In addition, the recently published Best Practices for
Legal Education: A Vision and a Road Map advocates an integrated
curriculum where theory and practice are merged and where
professionalism is taught pervasively throughout all three years of law
school. 104
Expanding the student practice rules to allow representation of clients
in any form of law practice met with no resistance during the ad-hoc
committee’s discussions with the court and was endorsed by public
commenters. The judges, like the law professors, were aware that law
practice, especially in a jurisdiction like the District of Columbia, was no
longer confined to litigation. Given that the Court had recently amended
its rules to provide a comprehensive definition of law practice, and given
that law students had to be prepared to practice in a multi-national world
where law practice encompassed much more than litigation, the judges
agreed that the rule should permit students to practice, with supervision, in
the same way members of the bar do. Thus, the amended student practice
rule adopted the broad definition of the practice of law contained in Rule
49 and permitted student representation in the following:
(i) Preparing any legal document, including any deeds, mortgages,
assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any other
instruments intended to affect interests in real or personal property,
wills, codicils, instruments intended to affect the disposition of
property of decedents’ estates, and other instruments intended to affect
or secure legal rights;
(ii)
Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
(iii)
Appearing before any tribunal that permits student practice;
(iv)
Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or
any written documents containing legal argument or interpretation of
law, for filing in any court, administrative agency or other tribunal that
permits student practice;
(v) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities
described in sub-paragraph (A) through (D) might be done, and
whether they were done, in accordance with applicable law. 105

The one exception that remains is the limitation on representation in
criminal cases. Both the law professors and the judges acknowledged that
(REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE
GAP) (1992) [hereinafter AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM].
103. WILLIAM SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS, PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW ch. 5 (2007).
104. STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75, at 97–98.
105. See D.C. App. R. 48(a)(3).
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the possibility of long sentences in felony cases made the stakes too high
to permit representation by students. Thus, students practicing in the adult
criminal trial court are permitted to represent only those people charged
with misdemeanor offenses. 106 This limitation, however, does not apply to
representation in adult probation revocation cases, prison administrative
hearings, or appeals. 107 The felony limitation does not exist in juvenile
delinquency cases because the penalties are not as harsh. 108
Although Rule 49 and the amended Rule 48 applied to all aspects of
practice within the District of Columbia, the Court recognized that it could
not control practice before other tribunals and that those other tribunals in
which the students might practice had an interest in regulating and a
responsibility to regulate students’ work. Thus, the amended rule permits
these other tribunals to regulate the eligibility of students, supervisors, and
clients, and to regulate the quality of student practice. 109 All students
practicing in the District of Columbia will, however, be subject to both the
ethical rules of the tribunals in which they practice and the D.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct. 110 Moreover, the rule mandates that, in all business
documents, students give prominent notice of their student status and that
their practice is limited to matters related to the District of Columbia or
another state, federal, or foreign court or agency that permits their
participation. 111
a. The Students
i. Year in School

The original District of Columbia student practice rules permitted only
third-year students to be admitted to practice. In 1982, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals amended the rules to permit students to
practice in the second semester of the second year of law school.112
Recognizing that no second-semester second-year student had been
sanctioned by any court in the District of Columbia, the ad-hoc
committee’s proposed amendments permitted all second-year students to
participate in a clinical program.
In formulating their student practice rules, several states have
recognized that the foundational skill of legal analysis is essentially
106. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1).
107. See id.
108. D.C. CODE § 16-2320(c) (2014). The misdemeanor restriction was embodied in the
1982 rule as well.
109. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1)(i).
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2).
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mastered by the end of the first year of law school, even though legal
analysis continues to be taught in elective courses in the second and third
years. Given the nature of most second-year courses, there is little to
distinguish a second-semester second-year student from a first-semester
second-year student. Non-clinical courses in both semesters in the second
year tend to stress legal analysis and offer students little more than
additional substantive knowledge in subject matters that are seldom the
subjects of clinic courses. Recognizing these phenomena, a number of
states 113 permit students in some or all circumstances to represent clients
after completing the first year of law school. The District of Columbia
Superior Court had also authorized students in either semester of the
second year to provide representation to convicted and incarcerated
children and adults in disciplinary and probation revocation hearings. 114
The Carnegie Report on legal education noted that permitting students
to gain practical client experiences early in their law school careers would
improve the overall quality of practice in the United States. 115 The
combination of training by clinic faculty and character screening by law
schools has demonstrated that students who take clinic courses, whether in
the second year or third year, are prepared to provide quality legal
representation and to uphold the professional ethics and values of the bar.
Such was the case with second-semester, second-year students in D.C.
clinics.
Ad-hoc committee members’ conversations with clinical teachers in
states that permitted second-year students to practice revealed that such
students performed their clinic duties well despite their somewhat limited
law school experience, and that they were generally welcomed by courts.
Moreover, the sophistication of clinical pedagogy today and the quality of
the clinical programs in District of Columbia law schools have eliminated
the competency problems that some anticipated when the District’s rule
was first promulgated.
The ad-hoc committee believed that relaxing the student eligibility
standards to permit any second-year student to participate in a clinic
would have a salutary effect on legal education, provide long-term
benefits to the practicing bar, and have no negative effect on student
performance or client interests. It would also expand the number of lowand moderate-income clients a clinic could represent. 116 Based on the
113. California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada,
New Mexico, and New York. Rules cited throughout this report may be found at Student
Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27.
114. Admin. Orders 07-19, 07-20, and 07-21, D.C. Super. Ct. (2007). The Superior Court
acted pursuant to the power granted by D.C. App. R. 49(c) (10).
115. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 103, passim.
116. The Access to Justice Commission has called for expanding the services available to
under-represented people. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 12.
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findings of the Access to Justice Commission, the recent administrative
orders of the Superior Court, and the positive experiences of students and
tribunals in other states with relaxed eligibility rules, the ad-hoc
committee believed that this modest change would produce only positive
results.
Altering the year-in-school requirement required little discussion by
the judges and garnered no objections during the public comment period.
The combination of the success of using first-semester, second-year
students in other jurisdictions and the efficacy of student practice in the
District for the past forty-five years easily convinced the judges that firstsemester, second-year students who were properly trained and supervised
in a clinic course could provide competent representation for clients. The
final language permitted students to represent clients after they had
completed one-third of their legal studies. 117
ii. Prerequisite Course Requirements

Because the original rule was litigation-based, it required every
student, no matter what kind of clinic he or she intended to join, to have
completed studies in civil procedure, criminal procedure, and evidence. 118
Due to changes in law school curricula, development of clinical pedagogy,
and expansion of clinical courses, such prerequisites were not always
germane to the areas of law in which clinics’ students practiced. For
example, rules of evidence are relaxed in many administrative hearings
and have little to do with tax preparation or business formation; courses in
American civil procedure are not directly useful for students working in
international human rights, tax, or legislative clinics; and criminal
procedure is not needed for practice in civil, legislative, or policy clinics.
The proposed amendments sought to eliminate specific course
requirements for students in all types of clinical programs. When the
District of Columbia student practice rules were originally promulgated,
law school curricula were rather static in their approach to instruction,119
and classroom components of early clinical courses were either nonexistent or experimental. Thus, it was reasonable for drafters of the
original rule, contemplating an active District of Columbia court practice,
to require instruction in evidence, criminal procedure, and civil procedure
as prerequisites for students seeking to represent clients pursuant to
student practice rules. 120 The drafters believed these prerequisite courses
117. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2); see Appendix B.
118. Although the rule said “studies,” not “courses,” it was generally understood to
require a course that taught those subjects.
119. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 1–6, 47–59.
120. See D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2).
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guaranteed that the students would possess some level of competence
before they joined the clinic.
In many other states, student practice rules once required similar
course prerequisites. However, state bars have recognized that wellstructured clinical programs provide better training for client
representation than do first-year survey courses. That is one reason forty
states and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit no longer require specific law school courses prior to clinic
participation. 121 Only two of the states that do require prerequisite courses
specify courses identical to those the 1982 version of the D.C. rules
required. 122
At some District of Columbia law schools, courses are no longer
limited to single legal subject matters. 123 Civil and criminal procedure
courses are sometimes taught as one Meta-Procedure class. Criminal law
and procedure are sometimes taught together with other forms of
government regulation. In many American law schools, Criminal
Procedure and Evidence are now elective courses rather than required.
There is also an increasing recognition that foundational survey
courses, such as those that were required by the 1982 version of the
District of Columbia student practice rules, teach little more than legal
analysis about the practice of law. 124 Many schools have added new
courses with practical skills components to balance the emphasis on
theory, and legal writing courses are more sophisticated than they once
were. Even though upper-class curricula now feature more problemsolving, experiential, and multidisciplinary courses than they did in the
past, students learn to merge theory and practice principally in their
clinical courses. The relevant substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law
and skills related to practice are now taught in-depth in the classroom
components of clinics, in case-rounds, and in the weekly individual
faculty-student supervision sessions that are the hallmark of clinical
pedagogy. Thus, the prerequisite courses required by the pre-amendment
rule are less important now to students’ preparation for representation than
they were when earlier versions of the rule were promulgated. The District
of Columbia Court of Appeals itself has recognized as much by granting
waivers of the prerequisite courses upon a petition by applicants to clinical
courses. However, the cost in filing fees and administrative action and the
121. States requiring prerequisite courses are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia.
Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27.
122. Arizona and Arkansas. Florida requires knowledge in these same subjects but not
separate courses. Id.
123. At Georgetown, for example, one section of the first-year curriculum combines
several traditional subjects. Students in that section learn Contracts and Torts in one
course.
124. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 103, at ch. 3.
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time lost to students in clinic courses while awaiting the Court’s waiver
order seemed unnecessary and counterproductive.
Clinic professors, the Bar, and the courts need assurance that students
are trained to perform with a high degree of competence when they
undertake legal work for a client; but it is the clinical course curriculum,
training, and supervision—not course prerequisites—that provide that
assurance. In clinics, students thoroughly learn lawyering skills and the
substantive law supporting those skills, through diverse methods of
clinical pedagogy. Many clinical courses have their own pre- and corequisite courses and/or pre-clinic orientation classes that require more
hours of instruction in law, evidence, and procedure than a typical firstyear classroom course provides. Once the orientation ends and the
semester begins, students spend twenty to sixty hours per week, depending
on the course’s credit allotment, on clinic-related learning. Some learning
occurs in the classroom, where the substantive and procedural law relating
to clinic cases and projects are discussed and critiqued. Much occurs in the
weekly student-faculty case supervision sessions, where law is translated
into case theory and strategy, and where execution of that strategy is
mooted. In addition, students learn a great deal about theory integrated
with practice during discussions prompted by multiple drafts of contracts,
pleadings and motions; direct and cross examination questions; briefs and
policy papers; and mooting student-prepared arguments, negotiations, and
legislative testimony. Of course, learning also occurs during appearances
before courts, legislatures, and agencies and in client counseling sessions,
where theory and practice come together to advance a client’s interests.
The concentration and specialization required for client representation
is learned in the clinic, not in substantive law lecture courses. It is now
commonly accepted in the profession that the training in substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary law that students receive in clinical courses
instills a deep understanding of and competence in the law and practice
that are the subjects of the clinic. Moreover, the knowledge and the
practice techniques learned in the clinic are retained longer than those
learned outside the experiential process. 125
This issue raised little public comment. Eliminating specific
prerequisite courses was questioned by the Bar Board of Governors 126 but
125. “Developments in philosophy and in learning sciences have made increasingly clear
the reciprocal interpenetration of cognitive development and social interaction . . . .
Skillful practice, whether of a surgeon, a judge, a teacher, a legal counselor, or a nurse,
means involvement in situations that are necessarily indeterminate from the point of view
of formal knowledge. Professional practice, that is, depends on judgment in order to yield
an outcome that can further the profession’s intended purposes.” SULLIVAN ET AL., supra
note 103, at 8; see also STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75.
126. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By
Law Students) (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author).
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only in relation to permitting non-Bar members to supervise students,127
and by the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law which wanted
to see specific details regarding the pre- and co-requisites before the
change was made. 128 Nonetheless, the judges and professors began by
expressing their different perspectives on how prerequisite course
requirements should factor into the updated rules. The ad-hoc committee
understood that both clinical courses and the basic law school curriculum
had changed significantly since the original rules were promulgated.
However, the judges were not as familiar with the changes in academia.
The law professors pointed out that prerequisite courses were not relevant
to some clinics—especially non-litigation clinics—and that they prevented
students from joining some clinics. The professors also stressed that clinic
students learned the substantive law and procedure used in their cases
more thoroughly in the clinic than in survey courses. The judges did not
question the value of the changes in the academy but initially believed
students would be better prepared if they took even more courses related
to their clinic work before they began to represent clients. While
acknowledging the validity of this assertion and the value in students’
training, the professors highlighted that law school is a time-limited
experience. The professors understood the pedagogical notion of
scaffolding as a way to improve a student’s understanding of the practice
of law 129—that when training is properly sequenced, learning is enhanced
and embedded for future use.
At some point, the judges abandoned their resistance and agreed to
eliminate mandatory course prerequisites from the student practice rule.
Their willingness to try a new method for ensuring preparedness derived
from the waivers of these course requirements they had granted in the
past, from the realization that few other states required prerequisite
courses prior to clinic enrollment, and from a clearer understanding of
pedagogical methodology that supported the ad-hoc committee’s position.
They also recognized that once they incorporated Rule 49’s broad
definition of the “practice of law” into the student practice rules, the
prerequisite courses would no longer be related to every kind of clinic.
The amended rules now require that law schools prescribe the
necessary pre- and co-requisite requirements for each clinical course to
ensure that students are prepared to represent people in the kinds of
matters with which each clinic deals. 130 The Court did not attempt to
127. See infra note 195, for a discussion of the proposal to permit visiting faculty to
supervise law students.
128. Comments by Cynthia G. Wright, Chair, Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of
Law, 3 (submitted March 6, 2014) (on file with the author).
129. Wallace J. Mlyniec, Developing a Teacher Training Program for New Clinical
Teachers, 19 CLINICAL L. REV. 327, 341 (2012).
130. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(2); see Appendix B.
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select those courses but rather left it to the good judgment of the faculty to
determine the appropriate courses.
b. The Clients
The 1982 rule, like the original rule, allowed students to represent
only “indigent” clients. There were two reasons for this limitation: The
court did not wish to take fee-generating cases away from the practicing
bar, and, more important, the Court and the Bar wanted to assist the
hundreds of poor clients who needed representation but who were unable
to retain paid counsel. 131 The ad-hoc committee sought to expand
representation by replacing the indigency restriction with a provision that
would allow students to represent “under-served persons” and leave it to
the good faith of the clinical directors to implement the rule. The ad-hoc
committee believed that the indigency requirement had become too
restrictive given the changing demographics of those in need of assistance
and that student representation posed little danger to the profitability of the
practicing bar. The ad-hoc committee also believed that the rules should
specifically permit representation of non-profit organizations. Although
the 1982 rules did not specifically preclude representation of non-profits
or tenant coops, the ad-hoc committee felt that clarity would eliminate any
ambiguity.
The ad-hoc committee advanced several arguments for expanding the
client base. The goal of all the clinical programs in all the District of
Columbia law schools is to provide legal services to under-represented
people and public interest organizations. A definition of “the underrepresented” that is limited to indigent people is elusive because the term
is subject to many interpretations. For example, the Access to Justice
Commission defined a low-income family as a family of four earning 200
percent of the federal poverty threshold or $42,201. 132 The Commission
noted that some organizations use 250 percent of the federal threshold as a
standard. 133 Though indigency thresholds are updated annually for
inflation, they have remained otherwise unchanged for decades and may
not accurately indicate who is truly poor. Indeed, while many routine
expenses have become increasingly important, including childcare, health
care, and transportation, their changing cost-values are not reflected in

131. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), had established a constitutional right to
counsel for indigent criminal defendants in 1963. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), had
done the same for alleged juvenile delinquents. Although no similar constitutional right
existed in 1967, unrepresented litigants were the staple of landlord-tenant court, small
claims court, and domestic relations court.
132. See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 21.
133. Id. at 19; see also id. at 21–28.
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indigency calculations. 134
The indigent litigants who still populate the civil courts have been
joined by the near-indigent who, like their poor counterparts, cannot find
lawyers to take their cases to court or represent them in matters not
involving litigation. 135 Clinic directors often turn away prospective clients
they are not sure meet the indigency standard. The plight of the near-poor
caused the Access to Justice Initiative to report that moderate-income
individuals may have even less access to legal assistance than individuals
in poverty. 136 District of Columbia law school clinics have been ready to
provide legal services, but the indigency limitation has prevented students
from representing under-represented people who did not fall below the
indigency threshold. Though people who need Earned Income Tax Credit
assistance, people interested in micro-enterprise and small business, tenant
groups seeking to form co-ops, dying people with small estates, and
individuals seeking bankruptcy protection may or may not be technically
indigent, they need legal assistance to participate fully in the American
economy and the American legal system. 137 Small claims cases, torts cases
with small damages, and most tenant claims do not attract the private bar
since litigation costs outweigh possible awards. Seekers of human rights
protection often have some ability to pay, but the costs of pursuing their
claims are usually prohibitive. Though some asylum-seekers are able to
pay some amount for legal services, few private lawyers specialize in this
field. The few public interest organizations and practicing lawyers that
have the necessary expertise often refer clients to law school clinics
because they themselves are unable to take on additional clients or
because clinical faculty and their program staffs have developed greater
expertise in these areas of law and practice. The clinics, however, have
134. Id. at 19–20; see also JENNIFER COMEY, ET AL., EVERY KID COUNTS IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: 15TH ANNUAL FACT BOOK 2008 19–20 (2008) (showing that
while public preschool and kindergarten enrollment has increased steadily annually
between the 2001–02 and the 2009–10 academic years, enrollment in federally funded
Head Start programs increased during the last two years of that period after remaining
stagnant since at least 2004). The American Poverty Act of 2008 would have required the
Census Bureau to develop new measures of poverty, but the bill died in Committee. The
American Poverty Act, H.R. 6941, 110th Cong. (2008).
135. In 2005, nearly half of plaintiffs with probate matters before the DC Superior
Court’s Probate Division were pro se. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 7, 129–34.
“Almost all of the small estate matters (i.e., those involving assets of $40,000 or less) and
the majority of the trust matters before” that tribunal had pro se plaintiffs. Id. Thirty-eight
percent of plaintiffs were pro se in adoption cases. Id. Over ninety-eight percent of
respondents were unrepresented in paternity and child support cases. Id. Ninety-eight
percent of all litigants—petitioners and respondents—in the Domestic Violence Unit
were pro se. Id. Only about three percent of defendants in the more than 46,000 cases
heard in Landlord and Tenant Court in 2006 were represented by counsel. Id.
136. Id. at 19.
137. Id. at 21–28.
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been reluctant to take on these clients because of uncertainty concerning
the application of the indigency requirement to the prospective client.
There is great need for legal assistance among people who are not
formally indigent, yet there are few practitioners able to take these
cases. 138 Given the volume of cases clinics actually take, little if any
competition with private practitioners for revenue would occur if the clinic
client base were expanded. 139 Most states have not limited students to
representing indigent clients: Student practice rules in only sixteen
states 140 limit representation to the indigent. Federal agency student
practice rules seldom contain indigency requirements, 141 and the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit does not have
an indigency requirement. 142 Although the ad-hoc committee did not
investigate the reasons many jurisdictions chose not to maintain income
ceilings, it nevertheless believed that the District of Columbia citizenry’s
needs were such that the D.C. student practice rules’ client qualification
standards should be relaxed. Given the difficulty of using income-based
guidelines, the proposed amendments sought to eliminate the indigency
restriction entirely in order to increase the number of lawyers able to serve
under-served populations in the District of Columbia.
Public comments supported expansion of the client base, but the
judges were initially wary of broadening the rules to allow student
representation of non-indigent clients. The judges correctly pointed out
that there was no shortage of poor people needing legal assistance in the
District of Columbia, and that the clinics were not wanting for clients. The
judges wondered whether a specific allowance of representation for nonprofits would drive clinics away from their public service model. They
wondered whether clinics would find interesting start-up companies more
attractive than public interest organizations or even poor clients, and thus
undermine rather than enhance access to justice. The courts had come to
rely on students in many of their divisions and did not want to see their
services diverted toward organizations that might start out small but
blossom into mega-corporations.
Over time, the judges’ discomfort with allowing students to represent
non-indigent people subsided. Perhaps the change was based on a
138. “[T]he needs of those who cannot afford a lawyer substantially outweigh the
available resources.” Id. at 10; see also id. at 43–82.
139. See id. at 42.
140. Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Kentucky permits representation of the indigent and of
students irrespective of financial ability. Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research
Guide, supra note 27.
141. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.1, 1292.1 (2014) (governing practice before the United
States Immigration Court).
142. Cf. D.C. App. R. 46 (2013).
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realization that all the law schools built their clinics on a social-justice
model, where those most in need of service were the ones who would
receive representation, and that the clinics were unlikely to abandon that
model. Perhaps the judges recognized that the Court’s own Access to
Justice Commission sought more lawyers for the near-poor. The Court
was also aware that many states had no indigency requirement. 143
Whatever the cause of the shift, the Court agreed to expand the rule
beyond indigency, and to specifically include non-profit organizations as
potential clients. The ad-hoc committee agreed to some limitation on
eliminating the indigency restriction.
It took time to find language that encompassed both the ad-hoc
committee’s and the judges’ thinking. The Court and the ad-hoc
committee ultimately agreed that the revised rule should permit students to
represent “any client who is indigent or who, because of limited financial
ability or the nature of the claim, would be unlikely to obtain legal
representation” 144 and to leave it up to the good faith of law school faculty
to implement the rule. The new rule would also specifically permit
representation of any non-profit organization, 145 eliminating the
uncertainty engendered by the 1982 rule and again leaving it to faculty
supervisors to select non-profit clients who could not otherwise find pro
bono counsel.
2.

THE ADMISSIONS AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS: CHARACTER SCREENING AND
DEAN’S CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the 1982 student practice rules, students seeking
authorization to practice were required to submit to a character screening
and be approved by the District of Columbia Committee on
Admissions. 146 The ad-hoc committee surveyed several state and federal
student practice rules and found that the process the District of Columbia
rules prescribed was far more cumbersome than what most states required.
Although the screening process was not as extensive as that required for a
lawyer applying for D.C. Bar membership, it did require time and effort
by court administrators and law school faculty, administrators, and
students. The ad-hoc committee believed that the process was redundant
and could be minimized by relying on the character screening that law
schools already undertook prior to students’ applying for permission to
practice.
The 1982 rules required that a law school dean certify that a student
was of “good character and competent legal ability” and “adequately
143. See supra note 140 (listing the sixteen states that maintain indigency requirements).
144. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1); see Appendix B.
145. See D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1).
146. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(1) (1982).
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trained to participate in cases or matters pending before the courts or
administrative tribunals.” 147 In ascertaining good character, the clinic
directors asked students a set of questions concerning prior arrests, school
disciplinary actions, alcohol and drug use, debt, mental health, and litigant
status 148—questions provided by the Committee on Admissions.149
Students who indicated that they had prior incidents concerning those
activities were required to provide written explanations relating to those
incidents, and official documents that confirmed their explanations. These
students were then counseled by the faculty about their prior actions so
that the dean could properly certify that each student was of good
character. Such students were also reminded that they would have to
collect this information again and answer with even more specificity to
state bar committees on admissions when they applied for full membership
as lawyers. Once a clinic director was satisfied that a student met the
student practice rules’ character requirements, the director forwarded the
student’s application to the dean, who certified the student’s good
character.
The dean was also required to certify the student’s competency, and
did so based on the student’s academic record. 150 Then the application, the
student’s answers to the questionnaire concerning arrests and other
potentially disqualifying information, the accompanying documentation
concerning those events, and the dean’s certificate of good standing were
submitted to the Committee on Admissions. The Committee on
Admissions reviewed a student’s application package in much the same
way the clinic director had before the application was submitted. The
Committee staff occasionally requested additional information but
conducted no independent investigation beyond reviewing what the
applicant had submitted.
No student in recent memory has been denied a student certification
once the documentation was provided. 151 Thus, the ad-hoc committee
believed that requiring a second investigation after a law school dean has
147. D.C. App. R. 48(b) (1982).
148. See Appendix C infra for the questions asked by the Committee on Admissions.
149. Today’s students may have many more notations on their records for minor arrests
and for school disciplinary actions than prior students had because of high school and
college zero-tolerance policies. These incidents, which usually occur well before entry
into law school, do not result in a denial of admission to the regular bar, but they can
cause delays in students’ certifications while documentation is collected from students’
home states. Students’ minor behavioral lapses are not different from those of their
predecessors. What has changed is society’s response to those minor behavioral lapses.
Notwithstanding this phenomenon, no student has been denied admission to practice
because of such minor transgressions.
150. Some, but not all, schools had minimum grade requirements for student
participation.
151. See supra notes 93, 95.
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certified a student’s good character, using the same information, created
unnecessary administrative burdens and costs to the Committee on
Admissions and to the clinic faculty who had to organize and transmit the
material. Students were disadvantaged because their work in the clinic and
their educational experiences were often delayed while students gathered
the necessary information and awaited decisions from the Committee on
Admissions. This problem was especially true in Spring-semester
clinics. 152
The ad-hoc committee noted that the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit did not require character screening by
a Bar or Court Committee on Admissions: It delegated the certification of
good character to the law school dean, 153 as did most federal courts. 154
Maryland and Virginia had minimal requirements: Applicants must be
familiar with state Rules of Procedure and Professional Conduct, and law
school deans must certify the students’ good character and academic
standing. 155
The ad-hoc committee found that only a few states required students
to be formally screened by the Bar to obtain a limited license to practice.
A search of the state student practice rules and conversations with clinic
directors at other law schools 156 indicated that most states required only a
familiarity with the rules and a certification by the dean as to character.
Only Florida by its rules required a formal character screening of all
students seeking a certification to practice. 157 Missouri rules required
screening for those students who also were pre-applying to the Missouri
Bar, 158 but no formal screening for other student applicants. Alabama
required a formal character screening by virtue of an interpretation of the
student practice rule, 159 and West Virginia 160 prohibited practice by

152. First-semester students usually gather the information during the summer.
153. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(3)(D) (2013).
154. See, e.g., 4th Cir. Local Rule 46(a) (2013); 3d Cir. Local Rule 46.3 (2011); 2d Cir.
Local Rule 46.1(e)(3) (2012).
155. RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MD. R. 16 (1990); RULES OF THE
SUP. CT. OF VA., PART SIX, § IV, ¶ 15 (2009). Maryland conducts no actual student
screening. Once a clinical program is certified, all future students are admitted upon
certification from the Dean. E-mail from Professor Eric Easton, Chair of the Maryland
State Bar Association’s Section on Legal Education and Admission to the Bar, to
Professor Wallace Mlyniec, Professor Georgetown University Law Center (Sept. 8, 2009)
(on file with the author).
156. Results of a discussion thread on the Clinical Legal Education Listserv among
clinical professors, conducted between January 26, 2009, and January 31, 2009, on file
with the author.
157. Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar ch. 11, R. 11–1.3(a) (2014).
158. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 13.02.
159. E-mail from Robert R. Kuehn, Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Skills
Programs, University of Alabama School of Law, to Professor Wallace Mlyniec,
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students who had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude or a felony
and by students who had been subjected to an honor code violation. All
other states required only a dean’s certification.
Requiring that lawyers and students be of good character is important
to preserving public confidence in the profession; but the District of
Columbia law schools’ procedures advance that goal much more
efficiently and productively than can screening by the Committee on
Admissions. For learning purposes, it makes sense for certification and
counseling functions to be performed by law school faculty rather than by
the Committee on Admissions. The student practice rules place ultimate
responsibility for students’ actions on supervising attorneys. 161
Supervisors are also responsible for their subordinates’ actions by virtue of
the Rules of Professional Conduct. 162 Finally, the dean 163 and the Court 164
may revoke a student’s license at any time if reason to do so becomes
apparent.
While in school, students are in the process of learning the law and the
norms and values of the profession. Clinic directors’ conversations with
students about character rules and professional norms and values impress
upon the students the need for and the importance of maintaining high
standards within the profession. Further, understanding their obligations
and responsibilities in the context of the actual practice of law helps
students to better understand the role of a lawyer in the legal system.
Formally enforcing character rules too strictly or too early prevents
students from enrolling in a clinic and from being exposed to the
professionalism they need prior to applying to the Bar. Ironically, students
most in need of professional socialization are sometimes deprived of those
lessons because a clinic director believes it will take too long to assemble
the written documentation for the Committee on Admissions.
The ad-hoc committee believed that it made sense to leave the certification
process within the schools and eliminate the Committee on Admissions’
redundant and time-consuming processes. Experiences in other states and
in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
demonstrated that screening and certification by a dean was sufficient to
guarantee the high standards the Court, the Bar, and the public required.
Only the D.C. Court of Appeals Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law objected to streamlining the character review and

Professor Georgetown University Law Center (January 25, 2009) (on file with the
author).
160. W. VA. RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW R. 10.1(c) (1989).
161. D.C. App. R. 48(e)(2).
162. D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1. (2007).
163. D.C. App. R. 48(c)(1)(ii).
164. D.C. App. R. 48(c)(1)(iii).
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application processes. 165 They believed that entrusting the task to the
deans created an “inherent tension between the law school dean’s
responsibility to undertake this obligation and the understandable desire to
include as many students as possible in an approved clinical program”166
and that the dean would not have sufficient time to devote to this task.167
Notwithstanding these objections, the ad-hoc committee’s proposal on this
matter met with no resistance from the judges. The Committee on
Admissions acknowledged that its processes for character screening
resembled those the law schools used, and the judges agreed that
redundancy was unnecessary. The final rule requires that a student “be
certified by the dean of his law school as being of good character and
competent legal ability and as being adequately trained to engage in the
limited practice of law as defined by these rules.” 168
3.

FEES FOR SERVICES

a. Student Stipends
Since 1968, it was understood that students should be educated, not
enriched, by clinical practice; students were to receive neither fees from
clients nor compensation from the court’s budget for representing indigent
defendants in criminal cases. 169 The ad-hoc committee understood that
students’ lives and financial constraints had changed dramatically since
1968. The ad-hoc committee also knew that students who completed a
clinical program often worked on clinic cases after they completed the
clinic course but could receive neither credit (by virtue of most law school
rules) nor payment (by virtue of court rules). Additionally, the ad-hoc
committee knew that students who completed the formal requirements of a
clinical program often wished to continue representing clinic clients under
supervision as volunteers or for additional credit or financial assistance
from their law schools. Some students who had graduated wished to
continue representing clients during the summer while they studied for bar
examinations. They were able to do so pursuant to the existing student
rules because an authorization to practice as a student usually expires in
July and can be extended until the student is either admitted to a state bar

165. Comments by Cynthia G. Wright on Proposed Amendments to District of Columbia
Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By Law Students), Chair, Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law (submitted March 6, 2014) (on file with the author).
166. Id. at 2.
167. Id.
168. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(3); Appendix B.
169. D.C. Code §11-2604 (2001), the Criminal Justice Act, permits payments to lawyers
for representing indigent criminal defendants but D.C. Superior Court Rules prohibit the
payment of such funds to students. Cf. D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44-I(f)(2)(A).
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or denied such admission. 170 The rules of the District of Columbia
Superior Court 171 and the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit also authorize students to continue representing their
clinic clients after the students have completed a clinic course. 172
Students asked by clinic faculty to continue with their duties are often
unable to do so without some remuneration. Clearly, the 1982 District of
Columbia student practice rules did not and could not prohibit paying
students who acted as law clerks on cases for their clinic supervisors.
There was uncertainty, however, about whether students could be paid if
they were acting as student lawyers pursuant to their certifications after
they had completed their clinic courses. The rules could be read to prohibit
students from receiving a student research or other like stipend from a law
school while working on clinic cases during the summer or during the
school year after completing a clinic course, because the student’s
authority to practice stemmed from a license granted pursuant to the
student practice rules. 173 As a result, faculty members were wary of asking
students to continue to work on their cases after they completed their
clinic courses. The ad-hoc committee believed that the rules should be
amended so that students could receive a research stipend or other similar
grant if they continued to work on clinic cases after they completed their
clinic courses.
The ad-hoc committee’s research found that the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit specifically permits law
schools to pay students for their work on clinic cases. 174 In addition,
twenty-five states specifically permit the supervising entity to pay students
for their work in a clinic, 175 and an additional twenty-one states do not
prohibit such payments. 176 The ad-hoc committee saw no reason to
prohibit students from being paid by the law school for work on clinic
cases after completing their clinical courses, so long as they were paid a
typical student research stipend or with a grant paying a similar amount.
170. See D.C. App. R. 48(c)(1)(i).
171. See D.C. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 44-I(f)(2)(A).
172. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(3)(C) (2013).
173. Surprisingly, the existing rules allowed students to receive salaries as employees of
the United States, the District of Columbia, and the Public Defender Service while
representing litigants, although these three entities no longer paid students who
participated in a law school clinic. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(6) (1982).
174. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(4).
175. See Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27 (including the
following states: Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, and Washington).
176. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See id.
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The ad-hoc committee proposed that the rule be amended to allow such
payments.
There was no public comment about this issue. The Court was initially
reluctant to authorize payments to students, based on the philosophical
notion that clinic work was pro bono work. The judges also worried that
payments for post-course work on clinic cases might be unregulated or
resemble the kinds of payments students received from law firms for
summer work. The law professors pointed out that students could already
be paid for all sorts of work on a case, so long as they acted as clerks
rather than as student attorneys. The ad-hoc committee assured the Court
that money used for student stipends would come from pro bono
fellowship organizations or from the schools in amounts no higher than
those received by law school professors’ research assistants. The
professors also reminded the Court that many other states did not restrict
such payments. 177 In the end, the Court agreed. The language the Court
ultimately chose reads, “[p]ayment of a student research stipend or other
law school based support, or a similar grant to a law student or a recent
graduate who continues to work on clinic cases after the completion of the
clinical course shall not make that student ineligible to practice under this
rule.” 178
b. Fees to Clinical Programs
The 1982 version of the District of Columbia student practice rules
was silent on the issue of the payment of fees to clinical programs, but
most clinical faculty assumed that law school clinics could not receive
fees. 179 Despite the absence of authority in the Court of Appeals Rules,
177. Id.
178. See D.C. App. R. 48(b)(5).
179. This created an interesting anomaly. If a clinic initiated a civil suit on behalf of a
client where the law professor was the attorney of record and students assisted as law
clerks and not certified law students, the clinic could obtain fees for the time that the
professors and the students spent working on the case. See Jackson v. Brown, 614 N.E.2d
847 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (awarding attorneys’ fees for student work); Jordan v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 691 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that fees award could include
payment to law school clinic even though students were unlicensed and even though
students themselves did not receive payment, and that reduction based on alleged
duplicative claims could not preclude payment to clinic entirely); see also Center for
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 696 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Ustrak v.
Fairman, 851 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1988) (reducing attorney’s fees award where excessive
time was billed at several steps of the litigation, including time for law student to review
Court of Appeals rules). But see Nkihtaqmikon v. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 727 F. Supp.
2d 91 (D. Me. 2007) (refusing to grant fees for clinicians’ work because billed attorneys’
hours were sufficient to complete necessary work); Brown v. Iowa, 152 F.R.D.168, 176
(S.D. Iowa 1993) (adjusting over-estimated attorneys’ fees, including student hours, to
reflect time reasonable lawyer should have spent); Weaver v. New York City Emp’rs Ret.
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clinical programs had been permitted since 1982 to receive fees, costs, and
penalties prescribed by law in civil actions in the District of Columbia
Superior Court, so long as the original indigency eligibility requirements
were enforced. 180 That provision recognized that judgments, statutes, or
settlements in civil cases often required the payment of lawyers’ fees. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also
specifically permitted law school clinics to receive fees for their work. 181
Clinical programs are expensive. Law schools expend millions of
dollars from their operating budgets on clinical education. In the early
years of clinical education, some of those costs were borne by foundation
grants, but for the most part those grants are no longer available. Law
schools must cover the costs of clinical education with tuition funds, and
tuitions spiral higher every year. Because of the low student to faculty
ratio in most clinics, the cost per student is generally higher than he cost
per student in a typical lecture class.
As noted in the Access to Justice Commission’s report, many lowincome and moderate-income clients cannot find lawyers because they
cannot cover the entire cost of a lawyer’s fee or because the outcome of a
contingency fee case will be too low or is too uncertain. The ad-hoc
committee believed that if the rules were amended to permit clinics to
receive fees below market rate or on a contingency basis, clinics could
assist more clients, including people with small damage contingency cases
and those who could pay a partial fee and also help defray the cost of the
clinical program. The ad-hoc committee also believed that the Superior
Court’s rule concerning statutory and/or court-ordered fees and sanctions
should be included in the Court of Appeals student practice rules to
forestall challenges by adverse parties. Because there are not enough
lawyers to meet the needs of low-income or moderate-income clients, such
a change would not result in clinics taking clients from the practicing bar.
Most states’ rules on fees and payment are less restrictive than the
District of Columbia’s 1982 rule on the matter. Twenty-five states
specifically permit students’ supervising entities to receive fees from
clients, 182 and an additional twenty-one states do not prohibit the
practice. 183 The ad-hoc committee believed the experiences in other states,
Sys., No. 88 Civ. 2662, 1991 WL 24320, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 1991) (awarding fees
for students’ work but adjusting amount). But see Wilkins v. Sha’ste, Inc., No. 99167
2013 WL 4138210, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 20131794 (Ohio March 12, 2014) (declining to award fees for legal interns’ work where
litigant was never under any obligation to pay).
180. D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 101(e)(1)(A).
181. D.C. App. R. 46(g)(4).
182. Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note 27.
183. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
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in the District of Columbia Superior Court, and in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit demonstrated the value of
authorizing the collection of statutory and other fees and sanctions
provided by law. The ad-hoc committee believed that specifically
permitting clinics to receive certain fees and sanctions would enable
clinical programs to provide representation to additional low- and
moderate-income clients and non-profit organizations whose needs were
not being met by market-rate attorneys. Thus the ad-hoc committee sought
a clear rule that permitted clinics to accept reasonable fees as long as
client income restrictions were met.
There was no public comment on this issue. For reasons not unlike
those that underlay its initial concerns about student stipends, the Court
was reluctant to approve an amendment allowing clinics to receive fees.
Moreover, the Court believed that law schools should support their own
clinics, and saw rising tuition as proof they could. 184 The ad-hoc
committee could not convince the Court to allow clinics to receive belowmarket fees from clients who could pay something. Nonetheless, the
parties reached an agreeable compromise, and the following language was
adopted: “Nothing in this rule shall prevent a law school clinic from
receiving court-ordered or statutory fees or court-ordered sanctions related
to a case or legal matter.” 185 We left the larger issues about below-market
fees from clients for another day.
4.

SUPERVISOR QUALIFICATIONS

Law schools, like other parts of universities, have a tradition of
inviting professors from other schools to visit on their faculties for one or
two semesters. Although non-clinical faculty easily accommodate visiting
and new faculty appointments, such accommodations are more
complicated for clinical faculty. Unlike visiting non-clinical faculty, new
and visiting clinical faculty members must not only be active scholars and
accomplished teachers but also active and competent practitioners. 186
New and visiting clinical faculty members from other states are
seldom members of the D.C. Bar. However, the 1982 student practice
rules required that supervising faculty members in clinics be active
members of the District of Columbia Bar and provided no exemption from
this requirement. This prohibition was somewhat surprising since the

184. The ad-hoc committee declined to engage in a complicated debate about law school
finances and pointed out that clinics were often the least well-funded recipients of law
school revenues.
185. D.C. App. R. 48(b)(5); Appendix B.
186. Since clinical education has become an accepted part of the academy, clinic faculty
members have gained enhanced professional status, security, and governance rights and
frequently are required to be productive scholars as well as able teacher-supervisors.
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District of Columbia allows lawyers who are members of other state bars
but not members of the District of Columbia Bar to practice and appear in
court pro hac vice 187 or while providing pro bono legal services. 188 There
is no history to explain why the original rule permitted only D.C. Bar
members to be supervisors; but as the Board of Governors of the D.C. Bar
argued, the differences between the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct
and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is a basis for precluding
non-D.C. Bar members from being supervisors. 189
The student practice rules’ faculty-restriction made appointing visiting
faculty in clinics complicated. Faculty visits are sometimes arranged
quickly because of an emergency. Visiting faculty members are sometimes
invited from other law schools for one or two years in order to test a
proposed new clinic, to provide release time for a clinic supervisor who is
attending to research or other administrative duties, or to be considered for
a permanent appointment. Although law schools usually pay the fees for a
professor’s bar admission, the delays inherent in the application process
often render a professor’s visit impossible or delay a visitor’s ability to
supervise students. Even if a visit can be arranged enough in advance to
permit supervision immediately upon the visitor’s arrival, many visiting
faculty do not want to go through the lengthy process of submitting the
D.C. Bar application and others simply do not want to maintain multiple
bar memberships.
Law schools, including those in the District of Columbia, have
expanded their clinical faculties to lower their student-faculty ratios and to
staff the increasing number of seminars and small classes that are now
prominent features of legal education. Appointing new faculty is
somewhat less complicated than appointing visiting faculty but can have
equally undesirable pitfalls. New faculty members are usually appointed in
the late spring preceding their initial year of teaching at the new school.
They often come from non-District of Columbia law schools, and
accordingly are members of other state bars. New faculty members
immediately apply to become members of the District of Columbia Bar,
but the process is lengthy and often incomplete before the school year
commences. 190 As a result, new faculty often cannot supervise students
until their second or third semester in residence, and schools are forced to
bring in short-term visiting faculty who are members of the D.C. Bar to
187. D.C. App. R. 49(c)(7).
188. D.C. App. R. 49(c)(9).
189. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By
Law Students) (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author). Related concerns
were voiced by the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law. Comments by
Cynthia G. Wright, Chair, Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law (submitted
March 6, 2014) (on file with the author).
190. See D.C. Code §11-2501 (2001).
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supervise students. If no local supervisor is available, the students, who
enrolled in the course months before, are unable to represent clients. 191
Other states’ rules concerning clinic supervisors are more liberal than
those of the District of Columbia. At least twenty-three states permit law
professors who are members of another state’s bar to supervise law
students in a clinical program. Seventeen states have specific rules that
allow special bar admission for law professors who are teaching in law
school clinical courses. 192 The ad-hoc committee was aware of six
additional states that allow law professors from other states to supervise
students pursuant to a more general rule that allows non-state bar members
to represent clients requiring pro bono assistance. 193
The District of Columbia Bar permits members of other state bars to
practice pro bono for two years and to practice pro hac vice without being
members of the District of Columbia Bar. 194 Given the experiences in
other states and the D.C. Bar’s liberal treatment of non-D.C. lawyers in
other circumstances, the ad-hoc committee proposed amendments that
would allow new faculty to supervise students while their applications for
membership in the D.C. Bar were pending and allow visiting faculty to
supervise upon quickly receiving a waiver of the default rule from the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. The ad-hoc committee believed
that this procedure would satisfy the Court’s and the Bar’s concerns about
the knowledge and quality of supervisors and satisfy the law schools’
academic needs and policies. 195
191. Usually a new faculty member is hired because there was no one else on the District
of Columbia law school faculty able to assume the duties of the clinic. Non-clinical
faculties are often unable to fill in because they are not members of the D.C. Bar or
because they have no, or at least no recent, practice experience. In other cases, a school’s
clinical faculty is not in a position to take on additional responsibilities.
192. Arkansas, Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico,
New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Student Practice Rules—Clinical Research Guide, supra note
27.
193. In addition to the seventeen states that permit law professors to run clinics without
being Bar members, an additional fourteen states permit non-Bar members who are not
clinical professors to represent indigent clients. They are Alaska, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Dakota,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and West Virginia. We have been advised that at
least Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia
consider clinics public interest organizations and permit out of state lawyers to supervise.
Id.
194. Comment to D.C. App. R. 49(c)(7) (citing Brookens v. Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120, 1124 (D.C. 1988)).
195. Based on the authors’ personal knowledge, permitting non-D.C. Bar members to
supervise would require amending not only the student practice rules but also District of
Columbia Bar Rule XI concerning disciplinary proceedings to make new and visiting
faculty members who supervise students’ cases subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and its Board on Professional Responsibility.
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Neither the judges nor the Board of Governors of the District of
Columbia Bar were comfortable with this proposed amendment. The
Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law had similar reservations.
Although the judges recognized the asymmetry between Rule 48’s
requirements for supervisors and Rule 49’s provisions for pro bono and
pro hac practice, they saw reasons to expect more from lawyers who
supervised students. They also believed that the District of Columbia had
enough qualified lawyers to fill visiting professor appointments. 196 The
The Court of Appeals amended Bar Rule XI when they amended Rule 48. Court of
Appeals Amends Rule Governing Legal Assistance by Law Students, Jurisdiction, D.C.
BAR (Oct. 8, 2014), https://www.dcbar.org/about-the-bar/news/rule-48.cfm.
196. This statement is partially true. The District of Columbia has an ample supply of
qualified lawyers. On the other hand, there is a significant difference between supervising
lawyers in practice and supervising students in a clinic. The goals of the two are different
and the pedagogy of clinical education is highly sophisticated and requires a considerable
amount of experience to master. See generally Wallace J. Mlyniec, Where to Begin:
Training New Clinical Teachers in the Art of Clinical Pedagogy, 18 CLINICAL L. REV.
505 (2012). D.C. Superior Court Judge Todd Edelman, former training director at the
District of Columbia Public Defender Service and a former Visiting Professor of Law at
Georgetown, described the differences this way:
The way I look at it, the goals of a criminal clinic supervisor are to teach
the students some things about the role of a lawyer, trial practice,
relationships with clients, the substantive law, and ethics, to provide a
public service, and to help students determine their suitability for this kind
of work. Those goals control, at least in a rough way, the model of
supervision. For the most part, the students do not view the work of the
clinic as their life’s work, and a good portion of my supervision (not only
at the beginning of the year, but throughout the academic year) consisted
of motivating the students by focusing them on the mission and
importance of the work and on the academic mission of the clinic. While
the goal of the clinic was to teach by allowing the students to do as much
as possible on the case, there was always an understanding that the
supervisor was ultimately responsible for each case and client. Finally,
because the point of the clinic is to provide an outstanding academic
experience, caseloads are kept low, and reflections on (and even criticisms
of) the models of representation are encouraged. In a public defender or
legal services office, the ultimate goal of the supervisor is to provide new
attorneys the tools to succeed on their own. Given the large caseloads of
line attorneys and the heavy responsibilities of the supervisors, as well as
the fact that the cases are the responsibility of the line attorney rather than
the supervisor, the type of intensive supervision of every aspect of the case
that should be the norm in a clinic cannot be and should not be the
supervision model in a public defender or legal services office. While the
supervision in a professional office is thus, less exhaustive and intensive, it
is aimed at improving higher-tiered skills. There is less space and need for
discussions of the overall value and ethics of the work. The supervision
focuses on broad questions concerning strategy and case theory, on finetuning trial preparation, and on the use of advanced trial techniques. It
does not focus on the day-to-day management or the preparation of the
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Bar was especially resistant, believing “there are risks in entrusting such
responsibility to individuals who do not have the relevant practice
experience in the District of Columbia and who are unfamiliar with the
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct and District of Columbia practice.”197
The Board noted that the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct differed
from the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct in significant ways, and
feared that visiting professors would not know the differences. 198 The
case. Nor does the supervision focus on the larger systemic and societal
questions that arise in the case, or on the personal development of the
lawyer.
Quoted in Wallace J. Mlyniec, Developing a Teacher Training Program For New
Clinical Teachers, 19 CLINICAL. L. REV. 327 (2012). It also misconceives the nature of
modern law faculties in which academic credentials are at least equally if not more
important than being a successful practitioner.
197. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By
Students), 3 (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author).
198. Id. at 3–4. The Board of Governors noted that “Under the D.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct (“D.C. Rules”) and the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (“ABA Model Rules” or “Model Rules”), the basic duties of competence,
diligence, loyalty, and protection of client information are substantially the same.
However, although some former differences were narrowed as a result of relatively recent
amendments to both the D.C. Rules and the ABA Model Rules, the D.C. Rules may still
vary more from the Model Rules than other jurisdictions that have adopted the Model
Rules format. In some instances, the D.C. Rules are more specific, for example, in
addressing the application of particular rules to government lawyers. In other instances,
the D.C. Rules are more general, for example, in addressing trial-related publicity in Rule
3.6. Some differences are substantive. Noteworthy differences between the D.C. Rules
and the ABA Model Rules include, but are not limited to, the differences in the rules on
written retainer agreements; confidentiality of information- both the scope of the duty and
a lawyer’s limited ability to use or reveal Rule 1.6 protected information pursuant to
narrowly defined exceptions; written waivers requirements; paying or guaranteeing client
expenses; imputation of conflicts of interests; a lawyer's ability to report out Rule 1.6
information when a lawyer represents an organization; safekeeping of property;
withdrawal; prospective clients; candor to tribunal; inadvertent production of privileged
documents; nonlawyer partners; solicitation; choice of law; and nondiscrimination. One
area in which the D.C. Rules vary significantly from the ABA Model Rules (and those
jurisdictions that follow the ABA Model Rules) is on Rule 3.3 (Candor to the Tribunal).
A specific example where a supervising lawyer unfamiliar with the D.C. Rules might
resolve an ethical dilemma incorrectly would be in a civil matter in which a clinic law
student discovered that a client’s statement/s of material fact were patently false and as a
result, the student's statement/s to a tribunal about a material fact or facts were also false.
The proper course of conduct would be to discuss and persuade the client to correct the
record, or to allow the student to do so. If the client refused to correct the record or to
allow the student to do so, the only proper course of conduct would be for the student to
seek to withdraw (pursuant to D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 1.16) without alerting
the tribunal as to the reason for withdrawal except under a very narrow exception. This is
because the reason for withdrawal is itself protected by Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality). In
contrast, a lawyer resolving this question under the rules of a jurisdiction that had
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Board felt that given the short terms of their stays, visiting faculty
members would not be invested in learning those differences. 199 The
Board also questioned whether the “high standard of supervision [could]
be maintained if the requirement of active D.C. Bar membership [were]
eliminated” 200 and worried that the students might be put at risk of ethical
violations based on non-D.C. Bar member supervisors’ misinterpretations
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. These fears assume that visiting
faculty members would immediately begin to supervise without
preparation and training to ensure that they understood key aspects of
District of Columbia law and practice. Such fears are of course, without
substance.
Despite these initial disagreements and the Board of Governors’
reservations, the judges and the ad-hoc committee looked for ways to
accommodate all the interests involved. A compromise solution was
derived from comments by the Bar’s Board of Governors. In its
comments, the Board speculated that the Court might be willing to allow
new and visiting professors to supervise without being members of the
D.C. Bar and suggested a series of conditions it believed would satisfy the
Board’s concerns and protect the public. The Governors proposed that
faculty members who were not members of the D.C. Bar should, like those
non-D.C. Bar members practicing pursuant to Rule 49, be members in
good standing of a state bar, have not ever been disbarred or suspended for
disciplinary reasons, and have not resigned membership in any state with
such charges pending. 201 The Governors suggested that non- D.C. Bar
member faculty supervisors be supervised by a member of the District of
Columbia Bar 202 and that they, like all new members of the D. C. Bar, be
required to successfully complete a course on ethics and practice
conducted by the Bar. 203 The judges and the ad-hoc committee accepted
these suggestions. The amended rules allow a practitioner who joins a
District law school’s permanent clinical faculty to supervise students if he
or she is an active member in good standing of the highest court of any
adopted ABA Model Rule 3.3 would have an entirely different ethical duty. Under ABA
Model Rule 3.3, the lawyer would be required to tell the tribunal of the material
misrepresentation, even if the client directed the student to stay silent. In the District of
Columbia, however, the lawyer's disclosure to the tribunal in most circumstances would
be a violation of D.C. Rule.
199. Id. at 3–6.
200. Id. at 3. The Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law had similar
reservations. Comments submitted by Cynthia G. Wright, Chair, Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 2 (submitted March 6, 2014) (on file with the author).
201. Comments by the Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Proposed
Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Legal Assistance By
Students), 7 (submitted February 12, 2014) (on file with the author).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 8–10.
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state, has not been sanctioned by any state bar or be pending disciplinary
proceedings, and has applied to the D.C. Bar within ninety days after
assuming his faculty position. Such a faculty member must be supervised
by an enrolled, active member of the Bar who is employed by the law
school, must be subject to D.C. Bar rules, and must cease supervising
students if his bar application is denied. 204 Similarly, a visiting faculty
member must seek a waiver of the student rule’s default provision
regarding supervisors rather than seek admission to the D.C. Bar and meet
the other conditions that apply to new faculty members. They must also
complete the Mandatory Course on the District of Columbia Rules of
Professional Conduct and District of Columbia Practice required for new
admittees to the District of Columbia Bar. 205
C. ISSUES ARISING FROM PUBLIC COMMENTS

Two issues that deviated from the ad-hoc committee’s proposed
amendments arose during the public comment period. The first concerned
the role that the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) would have
in promulgating rules for students who appear before District of Columbia
agencies. The OAH’s Chief Administrative Law Judge noted that the
OAH had promulgated its own rules concerning student practice 206 and
argued that it should be allowed to continue to do so. Second, some
members of the District of Columbia pro bono bar suggested that the
proposed amendments did not go far enough and that student practice in
pro bono matters should be decoupled from what they perceived to be
unnecessarily restrictive rules concerning clinics. The ad-hoc committee
opposed both suggestions based on pedagogical and client concerns.
1.

THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

The Chief Administrative Law Judge noted that the Office of
Administrative Hearings had promulgated its own student practice rules
that reflected the needs of the clients who appeared before OAH hearing
panels and the procedures used by its tribunals. 207 Although Rule 48
specifically covered practice before administrative tribunals, 208 the Chief
Judge and some clinical teachers believed that Rule 49 created an
exemption for lawyers and other persons practicing before D.C. agency
tribunals 209 and that the exemption was applicable to law students as

204. See D.C. App. R. 48(e)(4)(i).
205. See D.C. App. R. 48(e)(4)(ii).
206. 1 D.C.M.R. §§ 2833.4–2833.6.
207. See id.
208. D.C. App. R. 48(a)(4).
209. 1 D.C.M.R. § 2833.1, citing D.C. App. R. 49(c)(1), (4), (8), and (9).
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well. 210 Moreover, as several commenters noted and as the ad-hoc
committee and the Court recognized, non-D.C. lawyers and even nonlawyers are permitted by law to represent people in many of the cases
brought before the agencies. 211 Therefore, they asserted, no law or policy
prohibits law students from providing representation in similar kinds of
cases.
The ad-hoc committee recognized that Rules 48 and 49 seemed to
contradict each other, but it believed that Rule 49 was written for baradmitted lawyers, not students who were regulated by Rule 48. The ad-hoc
committee also noted that the OAH student rules were less stringent than
Rule 48, in that they allowed students to practice law in administrative
tribunals without participating in any formal training, completing pre- or
co-requisite courses, or having received a certification of good character
and legal competence. In addition, Rule 49 provided no academic
standards for supervising lawyers other than that they be members of the
D.C. Bar. 212
Because the ad-hoc committee believed that students were bound by
Rule 48, it believed that students, at least those who appeared in cases
where lawyers were required, should be governed by Rule 48. The OAH
believed it needed students to help the hundreds of poor litigants who
came before its tribunals, and argued in its public comments that it had the
authority pursuant to Rule 49 to create its own rules. The ad-hoc
committee recognized these concerns but believed the OAH position
invited a poor educational experience and could put clients at risk.
2.

THE POSITION OF THE PRO BONO BAR

The pro bono organizations, through their public comments, did not
object to an expansion of the student practice rules. Instead, many of the
public commenters believed that the proposed rules were too restrictive
and that pro bono organizations should be able to make more use of
students with fewer restrictions. Pro bono organizations pointed to a long
history of D.C. law students participating in pro bono work, performing
tasks similar to those students have performed in private law firms and
public interest organizations for years. Neither the 1982 student practice
rules nor the proposed amendments sought to affect this activity because
210. Comments of the District of Columbia Office of Administrative Hearings on
Proposed Amendments to District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule 48 (Student
Practice), submitted by Mary Oates Walker, Chief Administrative Law Judge, dated
December 31, 2013 (on file with the author).
211. See, e.g., Digital Broadcast Corp. v. Rosenman & Colin, LLP, 847 A.2d 384, 389
(D.C. Ct. App. 2004); Rood v. LaPrade, 444 A.2d 950, 952 (D.C. Ct. App. 1982) (“There
is no prohibition in the rules of the Superior Court against an appearance pro hac vice by
an attorney whose firm has an office in the District of Columbia.”).
212. 1 D.C.M.R. §§ 2833.4–2833.6.
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students working with pro bono organizations were not giving legal advice
or independently signing documents, and thus were not “practicing law”
under Rule 49. 213 When students assist lawyers with pro bono cases, only
the lawyers bear responsibility for the legal matters.
The pro bono organizations wanted more, asking the Court to allow
students to practice under the supervision of a pro bono organization
lawyer without complying with the rigorous requirements that
accompanied practice as part of clinical education courses. 214 The ad-hoc
committee feared that allowing students to practice without the formal
training clinics provide would create serious risks for clients and provide
poor education for the students.
D.

BASES FOR THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE’S OPPOSITION

1. EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE: MERGING THEORY AND PRACTICE

The clinical legal education model was developed to broaden legal
education and to equip students with the legal practice skills they cannot
obtain from the textbook-based theoretical coursework. 215 Though
opinions vary as to which practical skills are most essential, 216 clinical
legal education has generally sought to supplement the doctrinal
foundation and analytical skills the Langdell core curriculum ostensibly
213. The American Bar Association does authorize such programs but sees them as
providing a much different experience from what an in-house clinic provides. See ABA
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 18. When such
programs are affiliated with law schools, they are generally referred to as externships.
The language of the ABA Accreditation Standard does not contemplate actual client
representation.
214. See, e.g., Comments of the D.C. Bar Section on the Courts, Lawyers & the
Administration of Justice (not those of the D.C. Bar or of its Board of Governors) by
Fritz Mulhauser, Co-Chair, (submitted January 24, 2014); Comments of the D.C.
Consortium of Legal Service Providers, by Chinh Q. Le, Legal Director, Legal Aid
Society of the District of Columbia & Tina S. Nelson, Managing Attorney, Legal Counsel
for the Elderly (submitted January 29, 2014) (on file with the author).
215. See, e.g., Karen Tokarz et al., Legal Education at a Crossroads: Innovation,
Integration, and Pluralism Required!, 43 J.L. & POL’Y 11, 14 (2013); Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education—A 21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC.
612, 613 (1984).
216. One common view looks to provide education that develops what the Carnegie
Report has described as the three professional apprenticeships: “(1) teaching doctrine and
analysis, which provides the basis for professional growth, (2) introducing facets of
lawyering practice, which leads to acting with responsibility for clients; and (3)
inculcating professional identity, values, and dispositions of the legal profession, which
fosters ethical practice.” Tokarz et al., supra note 215, at 36 (citing WILLIAM W.
SULLIVAN ET AL., CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUC.
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 194 (2007)). See also AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, supra note 102.
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supplies. 217 The Association of American Law Schools and the American
Bar Association have envisioned clinical education as providing
instruction in everything from interviewing and fact-gathering to
developing case strategy to counseling clients to negotiating and settling
and trying cases—including developing methods for assessing one’s own
professional performance. 218
Essential to the central function of clinical education is the merger of
theory and practice and the reflection 219 upon that merger, which in turn
creates a process for lifetime learning. A student’s ability to perform a
skill adequately does not create mastery of the skill. The student must
learn the skill as an outgrowth of its underlying theory to truly “master” it.
Students should also learn to transfer the knowledge gained from the
mastery of one skill to a different skill that was not the subject of the
original action. For example, it is not especially difficult to teach students
how to perform the mechanics of a direct or cross examination—but
excellent education relates those skills to case theory, other skills
employed prior to and during a trial, and the doctrinal law that supports
and controls the exercise of those skills. Teaching a skill in isolation,
without teaching its natural relationship to other skills needed to protect a
client’s interest creates an underdeveloped understanding of that skill.
Such learning takes place in clinics on a daily basis. It does not in most
non-clinic experiential courses.
The spectrum of school-sanctioned experiential learning models now
includes simulation courses, in-house clinics, field placement programs,
and hybrid models of teaching and learning. 220 Although the goals of each
differ, each provides a form of academic inquiry that is missing from that
provided in a pure pro bono placement. In an in-house clinic, professors
217. See Anahid Gharakhanian, ABA Standard 305’s “Guided Reflections”: A Perfect Fit
for Guided Fieldwork, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 61, 80 (2007) (citing motivating third-year
students as a benefit of experiential learning).
218. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH. & AM. BAR ASS’N COMM. ON GUIDELINES FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC., CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, 14–15 (1980) [hereinafter
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION]; see also ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND
ADMISSION TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF
LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 3, at 17–18 (304(b) and 305).
219. “Reflective practice is the integration of intentional thought and specific action
within a professional context.” Timothy Casey, Reflective Practice in Legal Education:
The Stages of Reflection, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 317, 322 (2014); see also citations within.
220. See Elliott S. Milstein, Clinical Legal Education in the United States: In-House
Clinics, Externships, and Simulations, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 375, 376 (2001) (describing
the three models). There is, of course, variation among programs within each of these
categories. See, e.g., Neil Kibble, Reflection and Supervision in Clinical Legal
Education: Do Work Placements have a Role in Clinical Legal Education, 5 INT'L J.
LEGAL PROF. 83 (1998) (describing two types of field placement programs: the
“enhanced” model, which includes a reflection element such as a seminar, and the “pure”
model, which does not include such a component).
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have great control over the curriculum, but students are not always
exposed to the full scope of the non-legal challenges associated with
ongoing practice. In externships, where students to work with pro bono
organizations that provide a high level of academic intervention, students
see a broad range of law practice issues but seldom participate in all facets
of a case and supervision and critique are not as intense as they are in an
in-house clinic. Although summer employment, internships, and programs
proposed by the pro bono bar and the OAH are increasingly seen as
essential items on students’ résumés, 221 they do not and cannot provide
students with the academic structure needed to acquire the kinds of
knowledge and reflective learning 222 that effective and ethical practice
requires. 223 That can only occur in an academically-based program. Nonacademic pro bono activities are really on the job training experiences
without academic inquiry.
In-house clinics rely on the union of academic insight and real cases
to maximize student learning. As academics, clinicians aim to expose
students to elements of lawyering that are likely to be difficult to observe
in practice, such as case planning, theory development, and strategic
decision-making, because students seldom spend enough time with the pro
bono organization to participate in all facets of a case. Simultaneously,
and unlike non-academic pro bono placements, clinics place responsibility
for clients’ cases directly with students, enabling them to understand, in
the role of a lawyer, what it means to make complex decisions on
another’s behalf. 224 Implementation of the proposals from OAH and the
pro bono bar would decouple the theoretical and analytical training that is

221. See James H. Backman, Where Do Externships Fit? A New Paradigm Is Needed:
Marshaling Law School Resources to Provide an Externship for Every Student, 56 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 615 (2006); AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, supra note 102, at 270–71
(1992).
222. “Reflective practice is the integration of intentional thought and specific action
within a professional context.” Casey, supra note 219, at 322; see also citations within.
223. See, e.g., Tokarz et al., supra note 215, at 40 (“Students need the guidance of faculty
and repetition with increasing levels of complexity and variations of context, in order to
master the skills and develop the habits of reflective practice that are essential to the
professional identity of lawyers.”); see also Posting of Mary Lynch,
mlync@albanylaw.edu, to lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (Mar. 17, 2010) (on file
with author) (“The legal education reform movement underscored that only integrated,
well supervised, well designed opportunities provide the structure for sustained
development of professional judgment and professional identity.”); Posting of Kenneth
Kowalski, Kenneth.Kowalski@law.csuohio.edu to lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu
(Mar. 18, 2010) (on file with author) (acknowledging the value of field placement
programs especially where students cannot participate in in-house clinics, but asserting
that “in almost every instance a student will learn more about how to effectively and
ethically practice law in a clinic than in any other course”).
224. Posting of Wallace Mlyniec, mlyniec@law.georgetown.edu to lawclinicbounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with author).
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provided during the clinical experience through faculty guidance from the
practical tasks of client representation.
The distinctions between the in-house clinic model and pro bono
student programs are clear in terms of the type and quality of learning the
program provides and the that role law school resources play in helping
students achieve such learning. 225 Both models purport to develop
professionalism through modeling and mentorship. Proponents of nonacademic programs note that they are more flexible than law school
programs both in terms of students’ abilities to craft programs that fit their
needs and shape their own learning by choosing placements they desire
and by devising for themselves how to learn on the job. 226 However, it is
not clear that pro bono field placements can reliably deliver the effective
supervision that educators uniformly believe is the essential element of
success under any model. 227
Professor Vanessa Merton has noted how dramatically experiential
legal education can change when it is conducted without academic
supervision. 228 Her observations about the differences between clinical
supervision and extra-scholastic supervision raise serious concerns about
the degree to which experiential learning outside the clinical structure can
prepare students for practice, and about the quality of service advocates in
such programs provide clients. Partly in response to the New York Bar’s
pro bono requirement, lawyers in that state created mass pro bono
programs to address indigent communities’ legal needs, especially in the
wake of natural disasters. Merton proposes that these “justice incubators,”
which are staffed by independent but affiliated law school graduates with
some law school-provided supervision, can provide quality client service

225. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 218, at 14–17.
226. See, e.g., James H. Backman, Externships and New Lawyer Mentoring: The Role the
Practicing Lawyer is Filling in Educating Lawyers, 24 BYU J. PUB. L. 65, 77 (2009);
Backman, supra note 221.
227. See generally, e.g., KAY KAVANAGH & PAULA NAILON, EXCELLENCE IN THE
WORKPLACE: LEGAL SKILLS AND LIFE SKILLS (2007). See Tokarz et al., supra note 215,
at 40; STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 75. See also LIZ RYAN COLE & LEAH WORTHAM,
Learning from Supervision, in LEARNING FROM PRACTICE: A PROFESSIONAL
DEVELOPMENT TEXT FOR LEGAL EXTERNS 44–15 (J.P. Ogilvy, Leah Wortham & Lisa G.
Lerman eds., 2007). Cole identifies three characteristics of effective feedback: (1) nonjudgmental comments that offer specific examples of how the extern can improve, (2)
conversations that include (a) questions (from the supervisor to the supervisee) designed
to help the supervisor understand how and why the student arrived at the process she used
to complete the assignment and (b) alternatives to that process, and (3) specific
instruction on “how things should be done in the future.” Id.
228. VANESSA MERTON, PRACTICE IN EXTREMIS: SUPERVISION AND QUALITY CONTROL
(April 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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but that the kind of supervision students receive in incubators provide
differs from supervision provided for the same tasks in formal clinics. 229
In the in-house clinic, faculty supervisors meet frequently and
regularly with individuals and case teams in seminars, supervision
sessions, and case rounds 230 to transmit their knowledge and advice about
relationships between theory and practice. They simulate tasks, maintain
high-quality legal research and lawyering resources, and supplement broad
guidance with specific feedback. Merton observed that under field-based
models, supervisors may conduct one or two mass training sessions but
otherwise rely on the distribution of standardized materials and referrals to
websites and listservs to disseminate information. In such programs, errors
may be corrected directly at the request of individual participants, but
individual feedback is rare. 231 Although the programs Merton studied are
not exactly like those proposed by the D.C. pro bono bar, her research is
nonetheless instructive.
In the in-house clinic, training begins with fundamental theory and
emphasizes skills development and cultural competence in relation to that
theory. Simulation and individualized instruction tracks student
improvement, which can take “as long as it takes.” Non-academic
supervisors, however, typically provide legal instruction and tips to help
participants complete specific tasks that are in need of immediate attention
and action. Clinics employ self- and peer- evaluation to supplement formal
assessment (e.g. grades, recommendations, and certifications), but limits
on time and personnel usually prevent non-academic supervisors from
doing much assessment at all. 232
In clinics, teachers can address the complex intricacies of legal
practice the moment they arise. They have maximal control over their
students’ assignments and are afforded maximal time and resources to
guide students’ decisions and help them review their experiences. In short,
traditional clinicians have greater resources and greater autonomy than
even very good lawyers in programs where supervision is based outside
the school. As a result, students are likely to receive better education
through in-house clinics even when excellent supervising lawyers run

229. See also Laurie Morin & Susan Waysdorf, The Service-Learning Model in the Law
School Curriculum, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 561, 563 (2012) (proposing a hybrid clinic
that employs service work and a theoretical classroom component, which was tested
during the response to Hurricane Katrina).
230. Susan Bryant & Elliott S. Milstein, Rounds: A Signature Pedagogy for Clinical
Education, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 195, 196–97 (2007).
231. MERTON, supra note 228.
232. Id. But see Natalie Gomez-Velez, Structured Discrete Task Representation to Bridge
the Justice Gap: CUNY Law School’s Launchpad for Justice in Partnership with Courts
and Communities, 16 CUNY L. REV. 21, 33 (2013) (describing an alternative,
longitudinal approach to social justice apprenticeship).
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alternative programs. 233
Though scholars have devoted much effort to describing methods by
which students can make the most of the often meager supplies of
supervision available in their field placements and how mentors can be
trained to provide good feedback and guidance, 234 little has been recorded
to suggest that students themselves are dissatisfied with the feedback they
receive in either academic or non-academic experiential learning settings
where feedback is scarce. In one study, Professor Harriet Katz investigated
the results of a survey that asked students how frequently they
encountered modeling, feedback, collaboration, supervision, and
nondirective supervision in academic externship placements and how
often they learned from their own reflection. Katz found that students
emphasized global themes like motivation and immersion in the practice
setting, but not supervision methods, when they described their “best
learning experiences.” She also noted that students valued supervision
methods more highly the more frequently they were exposed to those
methods. 235
As far as we know, no such surveys have been conducted for purely
pro bono placements but it is probably safe to say that students would
answer the same way. Practitioners assigned to supervise students in nonacademic experiential placements are often ill-equipped to provide the
guidance students need to effectively take charge of their own
education. 236 Some legal professionals who supervise externs receive
formal training about effective supervision techniques from the legal
employer administering the externship 237 or from the law school, but
many do not. Those who do not may fail to provide effective supervision
for a myriad of reasons: They may incorrectly assume students already
have the skills required to complete a task, or they may doubt their own
abilities to teach the required skills. They may think giving complete
feedback is too time-consuming, or they may incorrectly believe that
providing examples of good work (e.g. legal writing) is sufficient to
impart the information and skills students need to succeed. Supervisors
may not know how to address differences between their own teaching
233. MERTON, supra note 228.
234. See, e.g., Liz Ryan Cole, Training the Mentor: Improving the Ability of Legal
Experts to Teach Students and New Lawyers, 19. N.M. L. REV. 163 (1989); KAVANAGH
& NAILON, supra note 227.
235. Harriet N. Katz, Reconsidering Collaboration and Modeling: Enriching Clinical
Pedagogy, 41 GONZ. L. REV. 315, 331 (2005–2006) (study of best externship supervision
practices).
236. See COLE & WORTHAM, supra note 227; see also Bernadette T. Feeley, Training
Field Supervisors to Be Efficient and Effective Critics of Student Writing, 15 CLINICAL L.
REV. 211, 215–16 (2009) (suggesting that practitioners may doubt their own abilities to
teach effective legal writing).
237. Cole, supra note 234.
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styles and students’ learning styles. Supervisors may view feedback as
criticism and be reluctant to offer feedback for fear of offending or
embarrassing students. 238 This is not to say that they are bad lawyers and
there is no doubt many are inspirational for students. Notwithstanding,
they cannot provide the kind of supervision a student receives in an
academic clinic.
Students seeking effective feedback may have to overcome supervisors’
preconceptions about the process, like the common belief that supervision
is tantamount to “spoon-feeding” and therefore at best, a waste of time and
at worst likely to interfere with the supervisor’s responsibilities to
clients. 239 There is no doubt students will learn something when
participating in non-academic pro bono field placements detached from
the clinical model; however, what they learn will be limited in comparison
to what they would learn in a law school clinic, and it will most likely be
task-related rather than integrated with complex theory and analysis.
2.

PRO BONO SUPERVISION: THE PROBLEM OF INEFFICIENCY

Liz Ryan Cole describes three types of supervisor-student
relationships outside an in-house clinic: (1) the ideal relationship, wherein
the student understands his assignment and quickly and independently
produces a product the supervisor is happy with; (2) a bad relationship,
wherein the student produces a good product but only with excessive
hand-holding and the supervisor is left wondering whether the work would
have been done quicker and better had he done it himself; and (3) the
nadiral relationship, in which the student does not understand the
assignment and turns in unacceptable work, leaving the supervisor closer
to his deadline but with nothing to show for his educational efforts. In
their zeal to avoid scenarios (2) and (3), Cole suggests, “many lawyers
avoid supervision as much as they can.” 240 Unfortunately, students in nonacademic experiential programs are unlikely to experience the ideal
relationship.
Supervision types two and three are hardly ever the product of
negligence; they merely reflect the realities of legal service organizations.
How supervisors perceive their responsibilities is critical to the
educational value of an experiential learning program because, as one
clinician put it, “[a non-academic placement’s] value very much depends
238. Feeley, supra note 236.
239. Id.
240. Id.; see also Henry Rose, Legal Externships: Can They Be Valuable Clinical
Experiences for Law Students, 12 NOVA L. REV. 95, 96 (1987) (suggesting that field
supervisors have little incentive to meet law schools’ educational goals). But see Janet
Motley, Self-Directed Learning and the Out-of-House Placement, 19 N.M. L. REV. 211
(1989) (expressing willingness to assume there are practitioners who will make good
teachers and role models).
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on the commitment of the placement to the student as opposed to only . . .
the work to be accomplished by the student.” 241 Because a supervising
attorney’s workload can rarely be adjusted to accommodate his
educational responsibilities when a student is assigned to him through a
field placement, pedagogical concerns sometimes necessarily come second
to other demands on the supervisor’s time, resulting in sub-optimal
educational opportunities for the student. Students’ skills at completing indemand tasks become more valuable than their developing good
independent judgment, and there is little time for exploration of larger
questions of justice that unite theory, practice, and ideals. 242 Because
clinicians must be both advocates and educators, an in-house clinician
may be able to represent five to seven clients in the time it takes him to
represent one with a student. If a non-academic supervisor were to try to
do everything a clinical teacher does, student placements would make the
office less efficient. If I am correct about my five- or seven-to-one ratio,
every student reduces a public interest lawyer’s client base by four to six
clients. The demand for representation by poor people is too great for that
kind of choice. The mission of legal services providers—to serve the
poor—would suffer. 243 Therefore, educating students must be a secondary
goal for pro bono organizations. In contrast, academic clinics hold both
educational and advocacy missions. They achieve these dual goals by
maintaining small caseloads—a luxury non-academic supervisors do not
have.
It is not even clear that non-academic placements fulfill the goal of
providing students with the invaluable exposure to real-life lawyering.
Because of clients’ demands, non-academic programs often fail to expose
students to the breadth of tasks that full-time practice requires. 244 Pro bono
placements often give students little contact with the full range of actors
they will encounter in licensed practice, actors such as clients, witnesses,
judges, and opposing counsel. 245 Because the assignments are task-based,
the experience sometimes produces myopic views about cases and legal
241. Posting of Kenneth Kowalski, Kenneth.Kowalski@law.csuohio.edu to lawclinicbounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with the author).
242. Posting of Wallace Mlyniec, mlyniec@law.georgetown.edu to lawclinicbounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with author).
243. “[S]upervising attorneys may be less likely than those at school-based clinics to risk
compromising client service for the purpose of student experience; after all, the agency
purpose is defined by service to their clients, not by education of the students they accept
as volunteers.” Katz, supra note 235, at 328.
244. See Posting of Jay Pottenger, j.pottenger@yale.edu to lawclinicbounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17, 2010) (on file with the author) (advocating for
hybrid clinics but “students who are not really the one exercising primary professional
responsibility for the client . . . are deprived of myriad opportunities to notice, analyze,
and make choices and decisions”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
245. Rose, supra note 240.
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issues, with the result that—contrary to the founding purposes of
experiential legal education—students have little opportunity to apply the
theory they have learned in the classroom. 246 This limited exposure to the
scope of real-world legal practice may be attributable to misalignment
between supervisors’ purposes and law school’s objectives. Although law
schools prioritize students’ experience and education, field supervisors are
often more concerned with gaining assistance with heavy workloads. 247
Many scholars—especially those who are skeptical about the mounting
popularity of experiential learning centered outside the traditional clinic—
hold that “learning how to learn” is perhaps the best skill a student can
acquire through any experience-based course of study; 248 however,
feedback often falters when law students’ work is seen as a tool to manage
the practical demands of a caseload. 249
3.

CLIENT CONCERNS

Requests by the pro bono bar and the OAH to use students outside the
clinical education context rely on the assumption that clients will be well
served by such representation. Two arguments support this assumption:
The first is that there is a great need for student representation because
there is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases. The second is that
in cases where the law permits lay representation, a law student is
preferable to a representative with no legal training. Both of these
arguments rely on the premise that a student is better than no one. There is
a great need for more attorneys to represent the poor, but to say that
untrained or marginally trained students can do the job implicitly makes
246. Id. Students who participate in field placement programs often review their
experiences in group discussions guided by on-campus faculty. This method of
supplementing non-academic supervision may be necessary given field supervisors’
understandable reliance on giving students task-centered work, but it is insufficient to
meet the educational imperatives of experiential legal education. Especially during the
era surrounding the start of the clinical legal education movement, the Langdell method
was critiqued on the basis that it relies on parsing appellate cases without sufficient
concern for the human interactions, judgments, and decisions that underlay them and that
these exercises are guided by teachers who themselves are detached from practice.
Educators concerned by departures from the in-house clinic model point out that a
clinical teacher who does not personally guide students’ cases and projects runs the same
risks casebook professors run: teaching in the abstract, to the detriment of the students’
theoretical
and
practical
learning.
Posting
of
Wallace
Mlyniec,
mlyniec@law.georgetown.edu to lawclinic-bounces@lists.washlaw.edu (March 17,
2010) (on file with author).
247. Rose, supra note 240.
248. Tokarz et al., supra note 215, at 41 (quoting EDWARD CELL, LEARNING TO LEARN
FROM EXPERIENCE ix (1984)) (“[T]he greatest justification of an experiential component
in formal education [is] not in the content of what is learned from those experiences but
in what is learned about the process of learning from any experience.”).
249. See Cole, supra note 234, at 168-69.
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an unacceptable statement about poor people: that the poor can do with
less than the rich.
Acceptance of the pro bono bar and the OAH’s proposals demands a
belief in the assumption that students’ performance and supervisors’
guidance will always be sufficient to provide adequate service to clients.
Accepting that premise requires a great leap of faith. Some members of
the pro bono bar hoped law schools would provide the requisite training,
but schools are unlikely to spend their training dollars outside of in-house
programs unless they jettison quality to save money. Moreover, it is
unclear who would guarantee that the students and supervisors will
actually provide good service if the clinical model is abrogated.
Ethical pitfalls are inherent when supervision and training are lax.
This is evident already where lawyers who represent the poor do little to
improve their skills. 250 Untrained supervisors may fail to instruct students
in law, skills, and ethics, leading students to inadvertently engage in
unethical or unskilled practices when their activities go unchecked. 251
This is not to say such behavior is intentional or even to say that it would
become common. It is sufficient to say that the checks on student practice
that exist in law school-based clinical education are likely to reduce
unethical and unsatisfactory results. No such checks regularly exist in nonacademic programs.
E. THE COURT’S RESPONSE

In the end, the Court did not address the pro bono organizations’
suggestions. The judges saw the issues raised by the pro bono bar as
outside the scope of the rule they were considering but saw the
modification of the student practice rules as a first step in a longer
conversation about the access to justice. Thus, they left the resolution of
the pro bono bar’s issues for another day. The Court did, however, permit
the OAH to fashion its own rules. 252 That decision was based on the fact
that non-lawyers may provide representation in many agency cases and
because the Court of Appeals Judges believed that the OAH, as an agency
of government, can be trusted to write and administer its own rules.
Whether the OAG seeks to strengthen its somewhat permissive rules to
ensure adequate training and supervision also requires further
consultation.
250. See, e.g., Vanita Gupta & Ezekiel Edwards, Too Many Still Wait to Hear Gideon's
Trumpet, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (March 18, 2013, 11:38 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/too-many-still-wait-hear-gideonstrumpet; John A. Lentine, Gideon at Fifty: The Broken Promise, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
375–91 (2013).
251. See Nancy M. Maurer & Robert F. Seibel, Addressing Problems of Power and
Supervision in Field Placements, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 145 (2010).
252. See D.C. App. R. 48(a)(1)(iii).
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CONCLUSION
Courts, the Bar, and law schools all share responsibility for training
students to become effective and ethical lawyers. That process, however,
is not static. It remains contextual, changing as the practice of law changes
and as teaching methods become more sophisticated. A main instrument in
advancing a student’s education is a student practice rule that reflects
contemporary practice and the best practices in legal education. When a
student practice rule no longer reflects contemporary practice or
innovations in teaching, the rule must be changed.
The new District of Columbia student practice rule accommodates the
needs and concerns of clients, courts, the bar, and the law schools. The
process we used demonstrates how several law schools, controlled and
somewhat constrained by the same court rule, can collaborate to develop
strategies that meet their academic needs, and then work with a court and
state bar to implement a rule that not only addresses academic needs but
further the interests of the legal profession, expands access to legal
services for low income people, and ensures that clients receive excellent
representation for their claims. Both the legal academy and the legal
profession in the District of Columbia have derived benefits from working
together to amend the student practice rule and will benefit from the
substance of the amendments. None of this, however, could have been
accomplished without the leadership of the D.C. Court of Appeals and the
judges of its Rules Committee.
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APPENDIX A
District of Columbia Student Practice Rule
1982 Version
RULE 48
LEGAL ASSISTANCE BY LAW STUDENTS

a.

PRACTICE
1.
An eligible law student may engage in the limited
practice of law in the District of Columbia in connection
with any civil case or matter (including any family and/or
juvenile proceedings) and any criminal case or matter (not
involving a felony) which may be pending in any court or
any administrative tribunal of the District of Columbia,
which by rule of such court or tribunal permits such
appearance as a part of a “clinical program,” as hereinafter
defined, on behalf of any indigent person who has
consented in writing to that appearance, provided that a
“supervising lawyer,” as hereinafter defined, has also
indicated in writing approval of that appearance.
2.
An eligible law student may also appear in any
criminal case or matter on behalf of the United States or the
District of Columbia with the written approval of the
United States Attorney or the Corporation Counsel or their
authorized representatives and the “supervising lawyer.”
3.
In each case the written consent and approval
referred to above shall be filed in the record of the case.
4.
A “clinical program” for which such practice by an
eligible law student is limited is a law school program for
credit, held under the direction of a faculty member of such
law school, in which a law student obtains practical
experience in the operation of the District of Columbia
legal system by participating in cases and matters pending
before the courts or administrative tribunals.

b.

REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS.

To be eligible to make an appearance pursuant to this Rule, the law
student must:
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1.
Be enrolled in a law school approved by the
American Bar association and the Admissions Committee
of this court.
2.
Have successfully completed legal studies
amounting to at least 41 semester hours, or the equivalent if
the school is on some basis other than a semester basis,
including evidence and criminal and civil procedure.
3. Be certified by the dean of the law school as being of good
character and
competent legal ability, and as being adequately trained to
participate in cases or
matters pending before the courts or administrative tribunals.
4.
Be certified by the Admissions Committee of this
court as eligible to engage in the limited practice of law
authorized by this Rule.
5.
Be registered with the Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee of this court.
6.
Neither ask for nor receive a fee of any kind for any
services provided under this rule, except that the payment
of a regular salary to a law student who is also an employee
of the United States or any agency thereof, the District of
Columbia or any agency thereof, or the Public Defender
Service shall not make that student ineligible under this
rule.
7.
Certify in writing that the student has read and is
familiar with the rules of the curt governing the Bar of the
District of Columbia, including the American Bar
Association’s Code of Professional Responsibility which
pursuant to Rule X and Amendment A thereof, constitutes
the standard governing the practice of law in the District of
Columbia.
c.

CERTIFICATION

The certification of a student by the law school dean:
1.
Shall be filed with the Clerk of the court and, unless
it is sooner withdrawn, it shall remain in effect until the
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expiration of one year after it is filed, or until the
announcement of the results of the first bar examination
given by the Admissions Committee of the this court
following the student’s graduation, whichever is earlier.
The certification may be continued in effect for any student
who passes that examination until the student is either
admitted by this court or denied admission to the Bar by the
Admissions Committee.
2.
May be withdrawn by the dean at any time by
mailing a notice to that effect to the Clerk. It is not
necessary that the notice state the cause for withdrawal.
3.
May be terminated by this court at any time without
notice or hearing and without any showing of cause.
Notice of the termination shall be filed with the Clerk and a
copy thereof sent to the law school dean of the particular
student.
d. OTHER ACTIVITIES.
1.
In addition to participating in pending cases and
matters as provided in section (a)(1) of this Rule, an
eligible student may engage in other activities of the
“clinical program” under the general supervision, but
outside the physical presence, of the supervising lawyer,
including:
i.
Preparation of pleadings and other
documents to be filed in any case or matter in which
the student is eligible to participate, but such
material must be signed by the supervising lawyer.
ii.
Preparation of briefs, abstracts and other
documents to be filed in appellate courts of this
jurisdiction, but such material must be signed by the
supervising lawyer.
iii.
Each pleading, brief, or other document
must contain the name of the eligible law student
who has participated in drafting it. If the student
participated in drafting only a portion of it, that fact
may be mentioned.
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2.
An eligible law student may participate in oral
argument in this court in the presence of the supervising
lawyer in any appeal, including felony and misdemeanor
cases, provided that there is filed with the Clerk a written
consent from the appellant to that appearance and the
supervising lawyer indicates in writing approval of that
appearance.
e.

SUPERVISION.

The “supervising lawyer” referred to in this Rule shall:
1.
Be a lawyer whose service as a supervising lawyer
for the clinical program is approved by the dean of the law
school in which the law student is enrolled.
2.
Assume full responsibility for guiding the student’s
work in any pending case or matter or other activity I
which the student participates and for supervising the
quality of that student’s work.
3.
Assist the student in preparation of the case, to the
extent necessary in the supervising lawyer’s professional
judgment to insure that the student’s participation is
effective on behalf of the indigent person represented.
4.
Be an “active” member of the District of Columbia
Bar as set forth in the rules of this court governing the Bar
of the District of Columbia.
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APPENDIX B
District of Columbia Student Practice Rule
2014 Version
RULE 48
LEGAL ASSISTANCE BY LAW STUDENTS
(a) Practice.
(1)
Pursuant to these rules and as part of a
clinical program, an eligible law student may engage in the
limited practice of law in the District of Columbia. For
purposes of applying this rule, the practice of law shall
have the same meaning as it has in D.C. App. R. 49, which
defines the unauthorized practice of law. Nevertheless, an
eligible student shall not represent a client in any adult
criminal case involving a felony in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia. This prohibition on practice in
felony cases shall not apply to parole revocation hearings
or prison disciplinary actions or to appeals before the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
If the
representation occurs before the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia, the Office of Administrative
Hearings, or an agency of the District of Columbia, the law
student must also comply with the rules of that court,
agency, or tribunal with respect to student practice. After
complying with the certification requirements of this rule,
an eligible law student may also engage in the limited
practice of law pursuant to the rules of any court, agency,
or tribunal of another state of the United States, an
international tribunal, or a court or agency of another
country which by rule of such court, agency, or tribunal
permits such appearance as part of a clinical program. This
rule does not govern practice before courts, departments, or
agencies of the United States which, by rule or regulation,
permit practice by law students. Students practicing
pursuant to these rules in a clinical program, as hereinafter
defined, may represent any client who is indigent or who,
because of limited financial ability or the nature of the
claim, would be unlikely to obtain legal representation, or
any non-profit organization, if the client or non-profit
organization has consented in writing to that appearance or
representation. A “supervising lawyer,” as hereinafter
defined or defined by the relevant non-District of Columbia
tribunal, must indicate in writing an approval of the
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student’s appearance or representation.
(i)
When appearing in any court or agency of
the United States or another state of the United
States, an international tribunal, or a court or agency
of another country, law students and their
supervisors shall be bound by the rules of that
tribunal governing eligibility to practice and
standards of practice and by the ethical rules of that
tribunal or by the District of Columbia Rules of
Professional Conduct pursuant to Rule 8.5.
(ii) Students practicing pursuant to this rule
must give prominent notice in all business
documents of the students' status and that their
practice is limited to matters related to the District
of Columbia or other state, federal, or foreign court
or agency that permits their participation.
(iii)
The Office of Administrative Hearings and
agencies of the District of Columbia may adopt
rules governing student practice. If their rules
permit, a student may practice before those agencies
and tribunals without being enrolled in a clinical
program, provided that the student meets the
requirements of D.C. App. R. 49(c) (5).
(2)
An eligible law student may also appear in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in any
criminal case not involving a felony and, irrespective of the
nature of the crime, any appeal in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, any parole revocation or prison
disciplinary action, or civil, family, or juvenile matter on
behalf of the United States or the District of Columbia with
the written approval of the United States Attorney or the
Attorney General for the District of Columbia or their
authorized representatives and the “supervising lawyer.”
(3)
In accordance with D.C. App. R. 49, the
“limited practice of law” described in section (a) (1)
includes the following so long as the actions are guided by
a supervising lawyer as defined by these rules or the rules
of the tribunal in which representation is provided:
(i)
Preparing any legal document, including any
deeds, mortgages, assignments, discharges, leases,
trust instruments or any other instruments intended
to affect interests in real or personal property, wills,
codicils, instruments intended to affect the
disposition of property of decedents= estates, and
other instruments intended to affect or secure legal
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rights;
(ii)
Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
(iii) Appearing before any tribunal that permits
student practice;
(iv)
Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings
of any kind, or any written documents containing
legal argument or interpretation of law, for filing in
any court, administrative agency or other tribunal
that permits student practice;
(v)
Providing advice or counsel as to how any
of the activities described in sub-paragraph (A)
through (D) might be done, and whether they were
done, in accordance with applicable law.
(4)
In each case the written consent and
approval referred to in (a) (1) and (a) (2) shall be filed in
the record of the case. If representation does not entail a
court appearance, such consent shall be part of any retainer
agreement entered into by the client.
(5)
A “clinical program” is a law school
program for credit, held under the direction of a faculty
member of such law school, in which a law student obtains
practical experience in the practice of law or in the
operation of the District of Columbia legal system by
participating in cases and matters pending before the courts
or administrative tribunals., or by otherwise providing legal
services to clients with regard to legal issues.
(b)
Requirements and Limitations.
To be eligible to engage in the practice of law pursuant to this Rule, the
law student must:
(1)
Be enrolled in a District of Columbia law school
approved by the American Bar Association and the
Admissions Committee of this Court, and be enrolled in a
clinical course at such law school. A supervised student
need not be so enrolled if that student has satisfactorily
completed a clinical course in a District of Columbia law
school and is either still in law school or working for the
clinic in the summer after graduation and is continuing to
represent clients of the clinical program. Notice of an
extension to continue practice under this rule must be sent
by the Dean to the Committee on Admissions. Such
extension may be permitted only once and may remain in
effect for six months.
(2)
Have successfully completed one-third of his or her
legal studies. Law schools shall establish appropriate pre-
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and co-requisite instruction to ensure that students are
prepared to provide legal representation to clients.
(3)
Be certified by the dean of the law school as being
of good character and competent legal ability, and as being
adequately trained to engage in the limited practice of law
as defined by these rules.
(4)
Be registered with the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Committee of this Court.
(5)
Neither ask for nor receive a fee of any kind for any
services provided under this rule from any client. Payment of
a student research stipend or other law school based support,
or a similar grant to a law student or a recent graduate who
continues to work on clinic cases after the completion of the
clinical course shall not make that student ineligible to
practice under this rule. Nothing in this rule shall prevent a
law school clinic from receiving court-ordered or statutory
fees or court-ordered sanctions related to a case or legal
matter.
(6) Certify in writing that the student has read and is familiar
with the District of Columbia Student Practice Rule (D.C.
App. R. 48), the District of Columbia Unauthorized Practice
Rule (D.C. App. R. 49), and the District of Columbia Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(c)

Certification.
(1)
A certification of a student by the law school dean:
(i) Shall be filed with the Committee on Admissions
and, unless it is sooner withdrawn, it shall remain in
effect until the expiration of one year after it is filed, or
until the announcement of the results of the first bar
examination given by the Admissions Committee of
this Court following the student’s graduation,
whichever is earlier. The certification may be continued
in effect for any student who passes that examination
until the student is either admitted by this court or
denied admission to the Bar by the Admissions
Committee. The certification may also be extended one
time for six months if the supervised student has
satisfactorily completed a clinical course and is either
still in law school or working for the clinic during the
summer, and is continuing to represent clients of a
clinical program.
(ii)
May be withdrawn by the dean at any time by
mailing a notice to that effect to the Committee on
Admissions. It is not necessary that the notice state the
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(2)

cause for withdrawal.
(iii)
May be terminated by this court at any time
without notice or hearing and without any showing of
cause. Notice of the termination shall be filed with the
Committee on Admissions and a copy thereof sent to
the law school dean of the particular student.
(iv) Once the certification is delivered to the court, the
student shall be registered with the Unauthorized
Practice Committee and a Student Bar membership card
shall be issued.
A certification of the clinical course by the law school

dean:
(i)
Shall accompany the Dean’s certification of the
student.
(ii) Shall certify that the clinical course and the pre or
co-requisite instruction are designed to provide the
student with classroom or individual instruction to
ensure that the student knows and understands the
substantive, procedural, and evidentiary law required to
provide competent representation.
(d)

Other Activities.
(1)
In addition to participating in pending cases and
matters as provided in section (a)(1) of this Rule, an eligible student may
engage in other activities of the “clinical program” under the general
supervision, but outside the physical presence, of the supervising lawyer,
including those actions defined herein as the “limited practice of law,”
with the exception of the following: appearing before a tribunal unless the
tribunal consents with respect to a non-contested matter; conducting
depositions; engaging in contract closings; and engaging in final
settlement agreements.
(2)
All pleadings, briefs, and other documents prepared for a case
and delivered to any tribunal, opposing or co-counsel, clients, or other
persons involved in the matter for which representation is provided
pursuant to these rules must be signed by the student and the supervisor.
(3)
An eligible law student may participate in oral argument in this
Court in the presence of the supervising lawyer in any appeal, including
felony and misdemeanor cases, provided that there is filed with the Clerk a
written consent from the client to that appearance and the supervising
lawyer indicates in writing approval of that appearance.
(e)

Supervision.
The “supervising lawyer” referred to in this Rule shall:
(1) Be a lawyer whose service as a supervising lawyer for
the clinical program is approved by the dean of the law school
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in which the law student is enrolled.
(2) Assume full responsibility for guiding the student’s work
in any pending case or
matter or other activity in
which the student participates and for supervising the quality
of that student’s work.
(3)
Assist the student in preparation of the case or matter,
to the extent necessary in the supervising lawyer’s
professional judgment to ensure that the student’s
participation is effective on behalf of any client represented.
(4) Except as provided below for new and visiting faculty
members, be an “active”
member of the District of
Columbia Bar as set forth in the rules of this court governing
the Bar of the District of Columbia.
(i) New Faculty Members.
(A)
A supervisor who joins a
District of Columbia law
school
clinical faculty may supervise students
if he or she is an active member in good
standing of the highest court of any
state, has not been suspended or
disbarred for disciplinary reasons from
practice in any court, and is not subject
to any pending disciplinary complaints
for violations of the rules of any court,
provided that the person has submitted
an application for admission to the
District of Columbia Bar within ninety
(90) days after assuming the position of
a clinical faculty member in the District
of Columbia and has submitted an
application to the Court of Appeals for
a waiver of this rule.
(B)
Such faculty member must be
supervised by an enrolled, active
member of the Bar who has suitable
experience and is employed by the law
school and connected with the school’s
clinical program.
(C) Such new faculty members shall
be subject to the rules of the court
governing the Bar of the District of
Columbia, including the District of
Columbia Unauthorized Practice Rule
(D.C. App. R. 49), and the District of
Columbia Rules of Professional
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Conduct which, pursuant to Rule X and
Appendix A thereof, constitute the
standards governing the practice of law
in the District of Columbia.
(D)
A new faculty member must
cease supervising students if his or her
application for admission to the Bar is
denied.
(ii)
Visiting Faculty Members
(A)
A supervisor who is a visiting
faculty member at a District of
Columbia law school for one year or
less may supervise students without
being a member of the District of
Columbia Bar if the visiting faculty
member is an active member in good
standing of the highest court of any
state, has not been suspended or
disbarred for disciplinary reasons from
practice in any court, is not subject to
any pending disciplinary complaints for
violations of the rules of any court, and
has submitted an application to the
Court of Appeals for a waiver of this
rule.
(B)
The visiting faculty member
shall certify in the application for a
waiver that he or she has completed the
Mandatory Course on the District of
Columbia Rules of Professional
Conduct and District of Columbia
Practice required for new admittees to
the District of Columbia Bar.
(C)
Such visiting faculty member
must be supervised by an enrolled,
active member of the Bar who has
suitable experience and is employed by
the law school and is connected with
the school’s clinical program.
(D)
Visiting faculty may extend
their supervisory duties pursuant to this
rule for one additional year by filing
notice with the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.
(E)
Such
visiting
faculty
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members shall be subject to the rules of
the court governing the Bar of the
District of Columbia, including the
District of Columbia Student Practice
Rule (D.C. App. R. 48), the District of
Columbia Unauthorized Practice Rule
(D.C. App. R. 49), and the District of
Columbia Rules of Professional
Conduct which, pursuant to Rule X and
Appendix A thereof, constitute the
standards governing the practice of law
in the District of Columbia.
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APPENDIX C
QUESTIONS
CONCERNING
CHARACTER
APPEARING
IN THE STUDENT BAR APPLICATION
PRIOR TO 2014
1. Have you ever been dropped, suspended, warned, place
on scholastic or disciplinary probation, expelled, requested
to resign, or allowed to resign in lieu of discipline, from
any school (above the elementary school level), college, or
university, or otherwise subjected to discipline by any such
school or institution, or requested or advised by any such
school or institution to discontinue your studies therein?
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including
supporting documents or records)
2. Either as an adult or a juvenile, have you ever been cited,
arrested, charged or convicted for any violation of any law
(except minor traffic violation)? Alcohol or drug related
offenses and moving traffic violations are not considered to
be minor.
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including
supporting documents or records)
3. During the past five years, have you been addicted to,
treated for, or counseled concerning the use of any drug,
including alcohol?
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including
supporting documents or records)
4. During the past five years, have you voluntarily entered
or been involuntarily admitted to an institution for
treatment of a mental, emotional or nervous disorder or
condition?
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including
supporting documents or records)
5. Have you ever been delinquent in any financial
obligations, including student loans and credit cards?
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IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including
supporting documents or records)
6. Have you ever been a party in any civil proceeding
(including landlord/tenant and bankruptcy matters) or
family law matter (including continuing orders for child
support)?
IF YES, you MUST submit a statement (including
supporting documents or records)
I do hereby state that I have read and understand the
provisions of the Rules of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals governing the Bar of the District of Columbia,
including the Rule of Professional Conduct which
constitute the standards governing the practice of law in the
District of Columbia; and that I will fully comply with all
the provisions thereof.
I further certify that I have read the foregoing document,
that I have answered all questions fully and frankly, and
that my answers are complete and true to the best of my
knowledge.
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